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ABSTRACT
This architecture study provides the ground work for implementing a new generation of
Byzantine resilient processors using authentication. The use of authentication allows a
significant reduction in the theoretical requirements necessary for providing Byzantine
resilience, or the ability to continue correct operation in the presence of arbitrary or even
malicious faults. This decrease in requirements led to a goal of providing a system which
combines the stringent standards embodied by Byzantine resilience with the lower costs
necessary to make the system viable for more markets than previous Byzantine resilient
processors.
A layering scheme is proposed which can be placed between the user and hardware.
These layers consist of protocols which provide the basic building blocks of the
architecture. The proposed authentication protocol which provides the digital signatures
used to verify the origin and contents of messages is a public-key protocol using 32-bit
Cyclic Redundancy Codes (CRC's) to encode the message with 32-bit modular inverse
key pairs to sign and authenticate the CRC. An interactive consistency protocol
responsible for correctly distributing single-source data between processors is built using
the SM(m) algorithm from [LSP82] with improvements suggested in [Dol83]. A voting
protocol responsible for generating a group consensus value guaranteed to be the same on
all nonfaulty processors suggests exchanging unsigned messages and then using a full-set
majority vote choice() function to calculate the group consensus value. Finally, the
proposed synchronization protocol needed to provide synchronized virtual clocks on all
nonfaulty processors is placed on top of a full message exchange (FME) known as a
From_all exchange to read the clocks on other processors. A time adjustment is then
calculated using a technique suggested in [LM84].
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1. Introduction
1.1. Problem Statement
Mission- and life-critical computing systems are demanding increasing levels of
reliability. Current allowable failure probabilities range from 10-4 to 10-6 per hour for
mission-critical functions and 10-6 to 10-10 per hour for vehicle-critical and crew-safety
functions [HL91]. As a result, the traditional method of designing fault-tolerant
processors using a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA)-based approach has
become extremely costly and time-consuming. To guarantee a certain reliability, these
systems not only have to show that the probability of a modeled fault occurring is within
parameters, but that the chances of an unpredicted fault is also within bounds. An
alternative to this technique avoids making a priori assumptions by allowing faults to act
in any manner, up to and including malicious and intelligent behavior. Such a system is
called "Byzantine resilient," or capable of withstanding Byzantine faults.
Making an architecture Byzantine resilient provides the ability to mask, or
continue operation in the presence of, a specific number of faults. The requirements for
such fault-masking involve lower bounds based on the number of faults that the designer
wishes to protect against. These bounds determine how many processors must be in the
system, what the connectivity between the processors must be, and how many times
information must be exchanged between processors. An additional requirement that the
individual processors be synchronized to within a known skew prevents one processor
from deadlocking the system.
Theoretically, af-Byzantine resilient processor which uses an authenticated
protocol (i.e., a protocol where messages are signed with digital signatures to allow the
detection of certain faults) has definite advantages over those using unauthenticated
protocols. These advantages include a decrease by a factor off in the number of
processors, the ability to eliminate of voting of entire messages, and a reduction in
required message passing and connectivity. The problem is that these advantages do not
necessarily translate into a faster, more efficient architecture when implemented. For
example, the increased message length due to signatures could seriously affect latency.
Before a processor providing Byzantine resilience using authentication can be designed
and implemented, a study is required to investigate the fault-tolerance issues involved in
such a computer architecture, to identify and propose solutions for the main functional
blocks needed for implementation, and then to implement sections of the architecture to
make decisions based on performance issues and to pinpoint areas needing optimization.
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1.2. Objective
There are certain practical issues relating to an architecture's Byzantine resilience
and multiprocessing which must be resolved: authentication, interactive consistency,
voting, fault-tolerant clock synchronization, and the performance of the proposed
architecture. The proposed architecture is centered around a method of signing messages
that provides unforgeable signatures which (1) allow detection of any alteration of the
message's contents and (2) can be authenticated by any processor in the system. A
cryptographic scheme must be chosen to balance the needs of data integrity against
performance. Interactive consistency (a process where all nonfaulty processors agree on
a vector, y) between the processors must be provided through a fault-tolerant distributed
decision algorithm. A voting protocol is needed to check for faults by exchanging
congruent information, that is, data which are the same on all nonfaulty processors. Fault
tolerance issues require that the clocks on all nonfaulty processors be synchronized to
within some known skew in order to guarantee termination of tasks [FLP83]. Finally,
performance issues involved in all of the proposed solutions (i.e., added latency due to
message signatures) must be taken into account. The objective of this thesis is to identify
and evaluate solutions to these problems.
1.3. General Approach
The first step in any computer design is to examine the motivations behind
developing the architecture. These motivations heavily influence any decisions which
must be made and therefore need to be thoroughly understood. Their relative importance
to each other must be clearly stated in order to settle any tradeoffs which appear during
the design process. Most importantly, any conflicts must be resolved before any other
work is done.
Once the motivations behind designing the system are understood, the architecture
needs to be split into its functionality blocks (i.e., interactive consistency,
synchronization, etc.). These functionality blocks provide abstract layers which are the
interface between the user and the system's hardware. The requirements for each block
must be outlined and then a thorough study of the theoretical work in each specific area
done. Once a solid foundation has been achieved, a selection process is performed in
order to choose algorithms that not only fit the problem being studied, but are also
14
realistically implementable. The tradeoffs involved in actually implementing the
protocols must then be examined in the context of the rest of the system.
Once the individual blocks are designed, an implementation needs to be done to
get a more accurate picture of how the architecture performs. Any design tradeoffs that
remain within the architecture can be tested to show the performance advantages and
disadvantages of each side of the issue This information can be combined with the
individual capabilities of each choice to make a final decision. These measurements can
then be compared to other Byzantine resilient processors to give a clear idea of what will
be gained and what will be lost if the architecture is later consummated.
15
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2. Motivation
2.1. Overview
The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory has been heavily involved in fault-tolerant
computing since digital computers first began to become a vital part of guidance,
navigation, and control systems. Starting with the Fault-Tolerant Multi-Processor
(FTMP), a project sponsored by NASA in parallel with the software-implemented fault-
tolerance (SIFT) program, Draper Laboratory began investigating the issues associated
with designing fault-tolerant computers to be used for controlling aircraft [HLS87]. A
number of generations of processors have followed the FTMP in providing highly
survivable systems. These systems were specially developed to provide extremely
reliable, real-time embedded capability for critical operations. The architecture proposed
in this thesis encompasses the next step in this progression.
This processor plans to provide the same high level of fault-tolerance and to
support the same type of applications as its predecessors. The main difference comes
from the use of authentication and the corresponding decrease in the requirements
necessary to provide the required reliability. These savings have been extended into an
attempt to cut the costs involved in such a specialized piece of equipment without
seriously impacting performance.
2.2. Fault-Tolerance Requirements
The traditional method of designing fault-tolerant systems is to use a failure-mode
and effects analysis (FMEA)-based approach. This technique analyzes likely failure
modes of the system, predicts the probability of their occurring, and then designs the
system to protect against those that are found to be likely to appear. The reliability of
such a system is based on the probability of an unanticipated fault occurring. With
reliability requirements of life- and mission-critical systems falling to less than 10-9 per
hour, this approach has become both extremely expensive and unrealistic. A way of
mathematically proving that a system will continue to operate in the presence of faults is
needed.
The need for fault-masking protocols was reaffirmed when certain strange and
totally unanticipated failure modes were observed. At least one in-flight failure of a
triplex digital computer system was traced to an apparently Byzantine fault and the lack
of architectural safeguards against such faults [MG78]. Also in circuit-switched network
17
studies at Draper, a failure mode was observed in which a faulty node responded to
commands addressed to any node [HL91]. Finally, a failed processor sending different
information to other processors was observed in the SIFT computer [Pal87]. Such faults
occurring in a system which is not designed to withstand them would be catastrophic.
The realization that designers could never protect against all possible failure
modes resulted in what has become known as the Byzantine General Problem. The
terminology and the theoretical foundation for work in this area comes from a paper by
Lamport, Shostak, and Pease [LSP82] where they state:
Reliable computer systems must handle malfunctioning components that give
conflicting information to different parts of the system. This situation can be
expressed abstractly in terms of a group of generals of the Byzantine army
camped with their troops around an enemy city. Communicating only by
messenger, the generals must agree upon a common battle plan. However, one or
more of them may be traitors who will try to confuse the others. The problem is
to find an algorithm to ensure that the loyal generals will reach agreement.
The generals correspond to processors while the messengers represent interprocessor
links. [LSP82] and papers that followed [Dol83, DS83, DDS84] provide a set of
requirements (lower bounds and protocols) which if obeyed make a system f-Byzantine
resilient, guaranteeing correct operation in the presence off arbitrary faults.
These requirements are necessary to guarantee the correct dissemination of single-
source information, vital for the operation of the overall system. Internal tasks such as
synchronization depend on the assumption that a certain set of the collected information
is accurate. Information taken from external interfaces comes from redundant sources to
prevent a single point of failure and must be utilized by the system. Figure 2.1 illustrates
a common example of information processing used for controlling an aircraft. Redundant
sensors A, B, and C deliver data such as wind speed and altitude to each of the processors
in the system. The processors then use a fault-tolerant exchange protocol to distribute the
input information so that each nonfaulty processor now has a correct set of the sensor
readings. Each processor performs any required filtering and computations before
performing a second fault-tolerant exchange to decide which command to deliver to the
redundant system effectors. If the guidelines are followed, there is no way forf or fewer
faults to corrupt the flow of information between the remaining nonfaulty processors.
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Figure 2.1 Information processing in a Byzantine resilient system.
2.3. Cost and Performance Goals
The previous Byzantine resilient systems at Draper have mainly been designed as
hard real-time embedded systems to be used on aerospace vehicles. Hard real-time
systems are characterized by the presence of hard deadlines where failure to meet a
deadline must be considered a system fault [SAE91]. This requirement places very
specific performance demands on the system. These demands must in turn be balanced
with the need to keep the system small so that it can be placed in the tight space of the
vehicle. Since the systems were built mostly for military or space projects, a premium
was placed on achieving high-throughput combined with fault-tolerance instead of
reducing costs. This need for high performance resulted in architectures which
implemented as much functionality as possible in hardware, often times proprietary, and
were highly optimized for a specific platform.
In this generation of processor, an attempt is being made to lower the cost of our
system and thus make it available to a wider customer base. Authentication is used in the
architecture because of its ability to lower the requirements in the amount of hardware
needed to make the system Byzantine resilient. For example, the number of processors
needed to protect against one Byzantine fault drops from four to three. These changes are
discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 5, but reducing the number of processors by
19
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even one is a huge improvement. A secondary goal is to build the system with multi-
platform capability. If the system runs on a variety of different processors, the user can
then choose a package depending on the amount of money they are willing to spend and
the level of performance desired.
These goals place a number of constraints on the structure of our architecture.
Any use of specialized and/or proprietary equipment must be avoided due to both their
high cost and compatibility problems. In fact, as much as possible of the system's
functionality should be implemented in software. If the individual protocols needed to
implement the required fault-tolerance are written in a high-level programming language
and placed as layers between the user and hardware, porting the system from platform to
platform is greatly simplified. One of the important purposes behind this thesis is to
examine the effect that these policies have on the overall system.
Each protocol has a number of different design options which must be examined
to find the one which fits the best with these goals. A great deal of throughput is often
sacrificed when functions are done by software instead of hardware. Different solutions
to problems need to be tested to determine which helps the system's performance the
most. Once all of the design issues are resolved, the resulting architecture must be
studied to find the sections which should be optimized, either by writing processor-
specific assembly code or adding additional hardware.
20
3. Fundamental Building Blocks
3.1. Overview
The proposed architecture has been designed using the concept of layers. The
layers serve as an interface between the user and hardware which provide the desired
Byzantine resilience. The use of software to implement the needed functionality removes
any dependence on specific hardware to build the system. The only contact that the
layers have with the hardware is through system calls which manage the reading of
physical clocks and I/O for sending and receiving messages. Each layer consists of one
or two protocols which are responsible for sending all necessary information to the user.
Figure 3.1 provides an abstract view of how these layers fit together.
Figure 3.1 Architecture layers.
The layer placed directly beneath the Application Layer is responsible for all
communications between the individual processors. Two protocols are implemented in
this Message Passing Layer. The interactive consistency protocol oversees the exchanges
used to distribute single-source information in a manner which masks possible faults. At
the end of an interactive consistency exchange, all nonfaulty processors have a
"consistent" copy of the data (the definition of consistency is discussed in Section 3.3).
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The voting protocol is used to gather and compare sets of data in order to reach a group
consensus value which is the same on all nonfaulty processors. This layer depends on
system calls to hardware to process messages and information garnered from the lower
layers.
There are two layers found below the Message Passing Layer. The first is the
Authentication Layer which provides the digital signatures to be appended to the end of
all messages. The authentication protocol within this layer directs the signing and
verifying of messages and is responsible for detecting active faults which affect the
contents of a message. The second layer is the Synchronization Layer which provides
virtual clocks, built on top of the system's hardware clocks, which are synchronized to
within a known skew. The clock synchronization protocol found in this layer is
responsible for starting synchronization intervals and adjusting the system's virtual clocks
to keep them synchronized. The protocol uses the Message Passing Layer to read the
virtual clocks on other processors and system calls to read a processor's own hardware
clock while fulfilling its functions.
The protocols found within these layers are the building blocks which form this
architecture. Each one must be completely specified and designed before any
implementation work can begin. The rest of the sections in this chapter give a general
outline of each protocol. Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 then give an in-depth description of each
problem and the final proposed solutions for each.
3.2. Authentication
Authentication forms the foundation upon which the rest of the architecture is
built. All of the other protocols are affected in some way by its presence. The
restrictions on the types of undetected faults which authentication provides allow a
reduction in the requirements necessary for interactive consistency. The presence of
signatures provides a new method of achieving group consensus. However, the need for
all data to be signed before it can be sent to other processors constrains the options
available for synchronization. The authentication protocol must therefore be the first one
to be designed.
Authenticated protocols were developed when the need for secure computer
communications first became apparent. Users realized that they required an efficient
method of verifying the identity of those sending them messages. Protocols were
designed to provide a wide-range of services from the establishment of secure interactive
communications between principals on different machines to authenticated one-way
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communications for mail systems and signed communications where the origin and
contents of a message could be authenticated by a third party [NS78]. Uses for this last
function were seen from the very beginning of work in the field of Byzantine resilience.
The first Byzantine resilient algorithm using authentication appeared in [LSP82].
The authors realized that the ability to append a signature to the end of all messages and
allow the receiver to verify the original sender and contents of the message made certain
powerful assumptions about faults possible. Faults can be classified as either passive or
active. Passive faults have no effect on the contents of the message and usually involve
messages being delayed or blocked. Active faults are directly connected to the contents
of the message. For example, a processor trying to masquerade as another processor or a
noisy link corrupting messages are active faults. The use of authentication allows the
designer to assume that all active faults are detected through checking the signatures and
therefore do not need to be masked by a separate message passing protocol (i. e., an
interactive consistency protocol). This assumption makes a drastic reduction in the
complexity of Byzantine resilient systems possible.
Unauthenticated Protocols Authenticated Protocols
Number of processors [LSP821 3f + 1 2f + 1
Connectivity [Dol83] 2f + 1 f + 1
Communication Rounds [DS83] f + 1 f + 1
Messages [DS83] O(n') o(nf)
Voting Required [LSP82, DS83] Yes No
Synchronization [DDS84] Yes Yes
Table 3.1 Theoretical requirements forf-Byzantine resilience.
The use of digital signatures allows a reduction in both the hardware and
communications necessary to provide Byzantine resilience. Table 3.1 compares the
theoretical requirements for unauthenticated and authenticated protocols as a function of
f, the number of faults which the system protects against. The number of processors and
the connectivity between them is reduced by a factor off. The same amount of
communication rounds are needed, but the number of messages which are sent within
each round has fallen. The final difference is that the processors no longer have to
perform a vote on the entire message since the signatures provide an encoded version
which can be compared instead. The effect these changes have on a Byzantine resilient
architecture is the main motivation behind this thesis.
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3.3. Interactive Consistency
An architecture's claim of Byzantine resilience depends on the protocol used to
provide interactive consistency. This protocol is utilized whenever data appears on only
one processor. Such single-source information must by exchanged using fault-tolerant
message passing techniques to provide congruent copies, or data which is the same, on all
nonfaulty processors. Common examples of single-source data are a reading from one
redundant sensor or the value of a processor's local clock. A more exact definition of
interactive consistency is a set of processors agreeing on a piece of information
originating from a single source in such a way that the following Byzantine Agreement
conditions are fulfilled:
Agreement: If any nonfaulty processor decides value V, then all nonfaulty
processors decide V.
Validity: If a nonfaulty processor starts with an initial value V, then V is the only
allowable decision by all other nonfaulty processors.
Termination: All nonfaulty processors decide on a value V within a known
amount of time.
The value V which is agreed upon by all nonfaulty processors is considered to be
"consistent." If the processors perform the same operation on this consistent data, they
are considered to be operating "congruently."
Obtaining interactive consistency in the absence of faults is a trivial problem since
the sender simply has to transmit its data to the other processors. Once Byzantine faults
are introduced, the process becomes much more complicated. Figure 3.2 illustrates our
problem in the presence of a commonly discussed Byzantine fault, a "two-faced" clock.
In this scenario, a faulty processor sends a different value to each of the other processors.
In Figure 3.2(a), faulty processor A sends signed messages containing conflicting data to
the nonfaulty processors B and C. Authentication does not help to discover this fault
since the two varying messages correspond to their signatures. If the protocol were to
stop at this point, B and C have no way of realizing that they have inconsistent, or
differing, information. The second round of message passing shown in Figure 3.1 (b) is
needed between B and C in order to discover the problem. After the second round, B and
C each have a set of two different messages which have verified as originating from A
and therefore, upon noticing a disagreement, each chooses the same default value.
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(a) An undetected fault. (b) Fault discovered.
Figure 3.2 Detecting a "two-faced" clock.
A protocol must be designed to implement the required message passing and
provide interactive consistency in the presence of Byzantine faults. It is vital for the
architecture to guarantee that after an exchange, the information on nonfaulty processors
is consistent. If a fault were to occur that caused conflicting data to be accepted on
nonfaulty processors, the actions of the processors could diverge, causing a failure of the
entire system.
3.4. Voting
The second protocol in the Message Passing Layer is known as the voting
protocol. This protocol is responsible for calculating a group consensus value which is
guaranteed to be the same on all nonfaulty processors. Periodic exchanges are performed
when processors are expected to be acting congruently, or performing the same
operations on identical data. The goal of these exchanges is to gather a set of values
containing an element from each processor to be used in calculating the group consensus
value. These voting exchanges are employed mainly by Fault, Detection, Isolation, and
Recovery (FDIR) tasks to detect faults.
Voting exchanges result in a set of data with elements from each processor and a
group consensus value. Since the processors are expected to be acting on congruent
information, the data from nonfaulty processors should be the same as the group
consensus value. FDIR tasks generate fault symptoms by comparing the group consensus
value to every element in the data set and marking every processor which provided
noncongruent data as faulty. Voting exchanges are also used just before an output to
filter any computational faults.
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The voting protocol is designed after the interactive consistency protocol because
it is constrained by interactive consistency requirements. The fault tolerance claims of
the entire architecture rest on the correctness of the interactive consistency protocol so the
voting protocol must be structured to fit with the other protocol. Also, any requirements
added by the new protocol are not allowed to come into conflict with the interactive
consistency requirements. The design of the voting protocol must be done to
complement the interactive consistency protocol.
3.5. Synchronization
One of the most important and complicated requirements for reliable real time
systems is the need for synchronized processors. In fact, Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson
show in [FLP83] that it is impossible to make an asynchronous system resilient against
even one fault. If one processor stops sending messages, the rest of the system could
deadlock. The other processors have no way of deciding whether the faulty processor has
failed or is simply far behind the rest. The normal solution to this problem of using time-
outs implies, by it very presence, some form of synchronization.
Other technical problems were discovered in the advanced fighter technology
integration (AFTI) F-16 program [Mac88]. The digital flight control system (DFCS) was
designed so that the three computers in the triply redundant system were not
synchronized. The designers believed that computer synchronization introduced a single-
point failure caused by electromagnetic interference (EMI) and lightning. The AFTI F- 16
program found that the asynchronous aspect of the architecture introduced errors in the
inputs due to time-skewed sampling by the different processors. An even more serious
problem became apparent in the verification process. The system became untestable in
that testing for each of the possible time relationships between individual processors was
impossible. This attempt at asynchronous operations only served to reinforce the need
for synchronization.
Synchronization requires that each nonfaulty processor have some idea of "real"
time within a known skew of all other nonfaulty processors. A clock falling outside of
this skew bound is considered a processor fault. Fault containment considerations make
it necessary for each processor to have its own local independent clock. Using one global
clock makes synchronizing the processors trivial, but also introduces a single-point
failure. The problem is that no matter how accurate the individual clocks are, they still
tend to drift apart over time. Clock synchronization protocols are used to correct for this
drift.
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Clock synchronization protocols implement virtual clocks in a way which should
be invisible to the user. The method used to synchronize the clocks must be chosen based
on the overall characteristics of the architecture. Another important consideration is the
amount of overhead introduced by the protocol. In the SIFT computer, twelve out of
sixty-six slots in each major frame were dedicated to clock synchronization and
redundancy management, an overhead of 18% [PB86]. A protocol which avoids a large
amount of overhead when the system is busy is preferred.
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4. Authentication
4.1. Overview
The Authentication Layer provides a service upon which the rest of the
architecture rests. Its authentication protocol uses digital signaturing techniques to allow
a recipient to verify the authenticity of a received message with high probability. These
signatures are used by the protocol to isolate the many types of active faults which can
occur within the system. There are requirements, both theoretical and practical, which
must be fulfilled by these signatures. The technique used to calculate the signatures must
also be flexible and comprehensive enough to detect events varying from messages
arriving late and outside real-time constraints to an intermediate processor repeatedly
transmitting a message. On the other hand, latency is added to message processing every
time a message is signed and verified, adversely affecting performance. The signaturing
function must therefore be chosen carefully to meet all requirements while accounting for
these problems.
Authentication protocols are defined by the type of signaturing scheme which is
employed. The most common types of protocols are based on methods using key-pairs to
sign and then verify a message. These protocols are classified into two groups, private-
key authentication and public-key authentication. In private-key authentication, a sender
generates signatures using a private-key; any receiver which wants to verify the
message's authenticity must also have access to the private key. On the other hand,
public-key authentication makes use of key-pairs where the sender signs the message
using a private key, while the receiver applies a public key related to the private key to
verify authenticity. Designing the final authentication protocol for this thesis involves
analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of these two protocol types, selecting the
best for this architecture, and incorporating a signaturing scheme which fulfills all of the
requirements mentioned in the next section. Finally, the machinery necessary for signing
and verifying messages needs to be build in order to investigate the performance issues
involved in authentication.
4.2. Authentication Requirements
Before work on designing the authentication protocol can begin, the many
requirements which must be met by the signatures need to be examined in detail. The
signaturing scheme is an integral part of any authentication protocol. The integrity of the
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individual signatures determines the reliability of the entire system, since the architecture
may not protect against undetected active faults which have defeated the authentication
protocol. Such an undetected active fault could cause a catastrophic system failure. At
the same time, attempts to make the scheme more robust often result in poorer
performance. There are two main issues which need to be investigated with these factors
in mind. The architecture's claim of being Byzantine resilient depends heavily on
theoretical assumptions about signatures. Decisions about how strictly these assumption
will be upheld must be made. Also, these assumptions need to be translated into
implementation requirements for the signatures.
All Byzantine resilient algorithms using authentication assume the ability to
generate signatures such that
Al: A sender's signature cannot be forged by another process.
A2: Any alteration of the sender's message can be detected.
A3: The receiver can readily verify the authenticity of a sender's signature-
message pair.
These assumptions can never be totally guaranteed in an actual implementation due to the
structure of digital signatures. Digital signatures consist of a finite number of bits which
can always be generated randomly by a processor. The signaturing scheme must be
optimized to provide the needed amount of security without affecting the rest of the
system.
Even though assumption Al cannot be ensured, it is possible to make forging the
signature extremely difficult. The probability of a processor forging a sender's signature
by random attempts decreases as the number of bits in the signature increases. For
example, if we assume that a processor generates messages at the rate of 106 per hour,
and a probability of system failure of 10-10 per hour is desired, then the probability of
forging a signature needs to be 10-16 per message. The signature would need to consist
of at least 53 bits to provide a probability of forgery of 10-16. This is only a lower bound
for the number of bits in the signature since this assumes random attempts to forge a
signature. Assuring unforgeability to malicious attempts may require a greater signature
length.
Similarly, assumption A2 cannot be guaranteed with unity probability since the
generation of an n-bit signature for a k-bit message, where n<k , implies that there exists
a signature which corresponds to at least two messages (and probably even more). Thus,
a processor may change the contents of a message with a finite probability that the
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changed message's signature is identical to the original message's signature. If we
assume that the signaturing scheme uniformly distributes signatures over the message
space, that is for all signatures v in the signature space Q, vi is the signature for exactly
2*-" messages, we can estimate the probability that a processor can undetectably corrupt
a message, leaving the signature unchanged, to be 2-". Figure 4.1 shows an example of
such a distribution. If a 2-bit signature is appended to an 8-bit message, there are only
22, or 4, signatures to represent the 28, or 256, possible messages. If a message is
corrupted, there is a 2-2 (14 ) probability that the new message falls into the message
space corresponding to the same signature. To provide a probability of undetectable
corruption of 10-16 per message would again necessitate a signature of 53 bits and a
"spectrally white" signaturing scheme.
Message
Space
Signature -
Space _ _ -
-a,_ 
_ _ - - - -
_ 
4. n-bits -
4-k-bits -I.
Figure 4.1 Evenly distributed signature and message spaces.
The security required by signatures is determined by the level of intelligence we
are willing to attribute to faults. For many applications, we can assume that faulty
processors may exhibit malicious behavior, but not to the extent of a malicious
cryptoanalyst, particularly in cases in which we are using authentication to protect against
random hardware failures in fast hard real-time applications. Therefore, our signaturing
scheme need not be cryptographically secure but only robust against randomly malicious
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behavior. Due to the malicious nature of some hardware failures we still need to exercise
some caution in determining a signaturing scheme.
Considerations other than the security of the signatures must be taken into account
in designing a signaturing scheme. Certain information must be provided in all
signatures to vitiate the many different types of active faults. First of all, signatures must
be host-specific to prevent one processor from masquerading as another. In the flawed
example shown below, processor B pretends to be processor A and sends "A says go",
signing it with S. If the signatures are not host-specific, processor C would accept the
message as coming from processor A.
Figure 4.2 Undetected fault with a non-host-specific signature.
Host-specific signatures keep a processor from being tricked as to the origin of the
message. Replaying the above scenario with host-specific signatures, if B sends the
message "A says go" and appends Sb to it, C will realize that the message did not
originate from A.
Figure 4.3 Detected fault with a host-specific signature.
Also, signatures must be message-specific in order to prevent an intervening
processor from corrupting a message and then appending a correct signature to it. In the
flawed example shown below, processor A sends "A says go" and signs it with Sa. If the
signatures are not message-specific, processor B could corrupt the message to "A says
stop," append Sa to it, and C would accept the corrupted message as authentic.
Figure 4.4 Undetected fault with a non-message-specific signature.
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Message-specific signatures keep a processor from copying another's signature and
appending it to a corrupted message. Replaying the above scenario with message-
specific signatures, if B corrupts the message from "A says go" to "A says stop" and
attempts to append Sa to it, C will detect that the signature and the message do not match
and discard the message.
Figure 4.5 Detected fault with a message-specific signature.
However, even with host- and message-specific signatures, an intermediate
processor can still erroneously and undetectably repeat a message-signature pair. In the
flawed example shown below, processor A sends "A says go" followed by "A says stop."
Processor B can erroneously save the first message and transmit it twice, absorbing the
second message without C being any the wiser, since both messages received by C
authenticate.
Figure 4.6 Undetected fault with a non-time-specific signature.
To eliminate this possibility, a monotonically increasing sequence number can be
attached to each message by the sender. The sequence number introduces a varying
message component which ensures that a relaying processor cannot undetectably replay a
saved copy of a message. Such replays would be rejected by the receiver because they
have identical sequence numbers. Sequence numbers also ensure that, when a source
intentionally transmits two identical messages, the signatures will differ because the
signature, which is calculated with respect to the message and the sequence number, has a
spectrally white dependence on both the message and the sequence number.
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A says go, 1,
A says stop, 2
1 A says go, 1, Sa,2
, says go, 1, Sa, 1
Figure 4.7 Detected fault with a time-specific signature.
4.3. Authentication Protocols
Authentication protocols are responsible for the mechanics of signing messages at
the sender and verifying their authenticity at the receiver. There are two basic approaches
to authentication used by such protocols, private-key authentication and public-key
authentication. Private-key authentication is the traditional type of cryptosystem which
has been used for centuries where anyone who wants to verify a message needs to know
the key used by the signer. On the other hand, public-key authentication is of more
recent origin (at least within this century), first suggested by Diffie and Hellman in
[DH76]. Diffie and Hellman proposed using key pairs where one key is utilized to sign
the message and the other key is used to verify both the sender and the message itself.
There are advantage and disadvantages to both types which need to be weighed before the
final protocol can be designed.
4.3.1. Types of Authentication Protocols
The approach for an authentication protocol implementing private (secret) keys
uses a signaturing function, v = Sk (M), which generates a signature v for the message M
based upon a key k. Every participant that wishes to authenticate messages from a sender
must possess k, the key the sender used to sign the message. A receiver i verifies a
message from a sender j by computing Sk (M) using the sender's key and comparing that
signature with the signature appended to the message. One problem with private key
authentication is that the authentication key must be identical to the key used to sign the
message. Hence a receiver which is able to authenticate a message from a sender j is also
able to forge outgoing messages with j's signature. Two methods may be used to prevent
this scenario from occurring.
The first method is to use pair-wise common keys. Each sender j has a different
key for each other node in the system. A receiver i has the key that each sender uses to
sign messages sent to i. (See Figure 4.8(a).) Thus in the worst case, a faulty node can
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only forge messages to itself. This solution creates a number of key management
problems and precludes the ability to broadcast information to all participants without
attaching a separate signature for each potential recipient.
The second method to prevent a receiver from forging a message is to
compartmentalize the receiver from the transmitter (See Figure 4.8(b).). By this, we
mean that the designer must insure that no propagation of key information from receiver
to transmitter is possible through the use of hardware isolation/protection mechanisms.
One method for doing this would be to only allow the transmit key to be set on power-up.
Again, this method creates a number of key management problems; however unlike the
previous method, it does allow a node to broadcast messages without attaching a separate
signature for each potential recipient.
artnent
laries
(a) Pairwise secret key system. (b) Compartmentalized single key system.
Figure 4.8 Approaches to private-key authentication.
In public-key cryptosystems each participant i has an encoding function which
generates a n-bit representation of the message, M, as well a signing function Di and an
authenticating function Ei with the following properties:
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BI: E(Di(M#)) = M#.
B2: Both Ei and Di are easy to compute.
B3: Di cannot not be inferred from knowledge of Ei with any reasonable
effort.
The nomenclature for the functions may be confusing, but it comes from the original
public-key proposal in [DH76] which envisioned the public keys being used to send (and
therefore encode) messages which could only be read (and therefore decoded) by a
receiver with the private key. We have renamed the functions to correspond to their uses
in our design, but have kept the original symbols. To apply the public-key cryptosystem
scheme to a public key authentication system, sender i encodes the message M, such
that M, is a n-bit number representative of M,,e,. The spectrally white encoding function
is common knowledge; computation of a CRC over the message is an acceptable
algorithm. The sender then uses its private signing function Di on M# to calculate the
signature. The receiver uses the authenticating procedure E, which is common
knowledge for all i, to verify the message. To be specific, for processor A to send a
message to processor B, the following steps are taken:
1. A computes M# = Encode(M,ext).
2. A computes the signature SA = DA(M#).
3. A sends (Mtext,S,) to B.
4. B computes M# = Encode(Mx,).
5. B strips off SA and computes EA(SA).
6. If EA (SA) = M#, then the message is authentic.
While public-key signature systems do not need secret keys, and broadcasts are possible,
they do require the availability of suitable functions Ei and Di which possess properties
Bl-B3. The public-key authentication method does eliminate the problems associated
with key management and allows efficient broadcasts.
4.3.2. Proposed Protocol Design
The decision about which type of authentication protocol to employ needs to be
made based on how authentication will be used by the system. This protocol is placed in
a low level layer beneath the message passing protocols. It is necessary for the
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processors to be able to broadcast message to the other processors without incurring
performance hits. Also, remember one of the goals behind this architecture is to
implement as much as possible, if not all, of the functionality in software in order to cut
costs. Avoiding problems with key management or the need for hardware
isolation/protection mechanisms is therefore desired. These factors made public-key
authentication the obvious choice for this system.
The final proposed protocol is a public-key cryptosystem based on Cyclic
Redundancy Codes (CRC's) and modular inverses. CRC's provide a spectrally white
means of encoding the message which is relatively simple to either code in software or
build in hardware. From the evaluation discussed previously in Section 4.2, the number
of bits necessary to make the probability of forgery adequate for our applications
necessitates a CRC of greater than 53 bits. For ease of implementation, this would
require a CRC length of 64 bits (the closest multiple of a byte to 53). The signing and
authenticating functions use modular inverse keys which are two numbers, P and P- (P
inverse), for which P P-' mod 2" = 1 is true where 2" is a very large number. P acts as
the private signature key while P-l is the public signature key. Several examples of
modular inverses are:
13.5mod2 5 = 1
1033 569mod2 1n = 1
9294586028090703467 350969587744990515 mod 2 = 1.
The signing function, Di(M#), is P M# mod2" while the authenticating function, Ei(Si)
is Si P-' mod2" where 2" is the number of possible signature configurations (and n is
the number of bits in the signature) and M# is a n-bit representation of the message. B 1
from the previous section is fulfilled since
Ei(Di(M.)) = (P M# mod 2" ). p-i mod 2" = M#, (P. P-' mod 2") = M#
(Please note that (x mod 2")mod 2" = xmod 2").
B2 is also upheld because both Ei and D, contain only n-bit multiplication and modulus
functions. The steps necessary to infer Di from E, are discussed in the next section, but
do require a large amount of effort, satisfying B3.
The protocol uses a combination of these functions to provide its signatures and
then authenticate its messages. When processor A sends a message to processor B, the
following steps are taken:
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1. A computes M# = CRC(Mext).
2. A computes the signature SA = DA (M#) = P M# mod 2'.
3. A sends (M,e,, SA) to B.
4. B computes M# = CRC(Mext).
5. B strips off SA and computes EA(SA) = SA P-' mod 2.
6. If EA (SA) = M#, then the message is authentic.
4.4. Key Generation
The signing function Di and the authenticating function Ei require a pair of
modular inverse keys, P and P-', for each processor in the system. P is used by Di as the
private key and is assigned to only one processor. P-' acts as the public key for Ei and a
table of all public keys is maintained on every processor. The only key management
required by these pairs is at compilation time when the private key initialization routines
for each individual processor are placed in separate files to ensure isolation.
The key pairs are generated using an extended version of Euclid's algorithm found
in [Knu69]. Euclid's algorithm is a famous method for finding the greatest common
denominator (gcd) of two numbers, u and v. Knuth extended it to calculate two more
integers, u' and v', such that
u-u'+v v'= gcd(u,v), (4.1)
at the same time gcd(u,v) is being found. In order to use this algorithm, we note that if
P P-'mod2 n =1 (4.2)
(the definition of modular inverses), then by the definition of the mod function,
P P-' = 2 v' + 1, or (4.3)
p. p-1+ 2n v'= 1 (4.4)
where v' is some constant. Therefore if 2" is substituted for v and a prospective n-bit
private key is chosen at random for u, Knuth's algorithm solves
P. P-' + 2" . v' = gcd(P,22"). (4.5)
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If gcd(P,2") • 1, then we know that P is not co-prime with respect to 2" and must try
another key. Also, we must discard P-' if it is negative. Otherwise, we may use the key
pair, P and P-'. Appendix A contains a list of 64-bit modular inverses generated with
this technique.
4.5. Cyclic Redundancy Codes (CRC's)
Cyclic Redundancy Codes, or CRC's, provide the encoding function which is a
vital part of our public-key authentication protocol. Encoding functions are responsible
for calculating a message-specific sequence of bits which are spectrally white and can be
used to detect errors within the actual message. CRC's are a fast and efficient method
which are well known for their ease of implementation, both in hardware and software.
While not cryptographically secure, the probability of a faulty process randomly forging
the correct signature decreases as the CRC length increases, at a rate of 2-n for a n-bit
CRC.
CRC's come originally from finite field theory. Sequences of bits are defined as
binary polynomials, where each bit represents a coefficient. For example, the five-bit
sequence, 10101, would be associated with the fourth order polynomial,
r(x) = 1+ 0 .x + 1 x 2 + O .X 3+ 1 .X4 = 1+ x 2 + X4 . When a message is represented by
such a polynomial, the CRC of the message is defined as the remainder of the modulo-
two division of the message polynomial by a particular CRC generator polynomial
[Gal90]. Figure 4.9 shows an example of how a CRC is generated. The CRC-16
generator polynomial, g(x) = 1 + x 2 + x15 + x16, is used to encode the message 101011.
The remainder of the modulo-two division, s(x), is 0111110100000000 which becomes
the CRC.
xS x2+ x
x16 +x1 5 + 2+ 1 [ x2 1+x2 0 + +x18 ++x1 6
x21 + x20 + + x7+ x5
X1 8 + X16 + X7 + X5
x18 +x1 7 +x4 +x 
x17 +x16 + + X5 + 4 +x2
x17 +x16 + x 3 + x
x7+ x5 +x4+ x3+ x2+x
S(X)= x7 +x5 + x4 +x3 +x2 +x
Figure 4.9 Example of CRC encoding [RG88].
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The following sections are a condensed overview of the CRC techniques used for
this protocol. If the reader wishes a more in-depth look into the subject, an article by T.
V. Ramabadran and S. S. Gaitonde, titled "A Tutorial on CRC Computations," [RG88] is
highly recommended. The most important component in implementing CRC's is the
generator polynomial since this polynomial solely determines the error detection
properties of CRC's. A detailed explanation of these capabilities and how a 64-bit
generator polynomial was derived is found below. This is followed by a description of
possible implementation techniques.
4.5.1. Error Detection and Generator Polynomials
The error detection capability of a CRC is controlled by the choice of generator
polynomial. The issues involved can be better understood if a corrupted message is
represented by the (n + k)" order polynomial, r(x) = v(x) + e(x), where v(x) is the
original message of k bits of data with a n-bit signature and e(x) contains the bits in error
(e(x) = 0, if the message is uncorrupted). The message is examined for errors by
dividing r(x) by the generator polynomial, g(x), and checking for a zero remainder. The
only way errors can go undetected is if the error polynomial, e(x), is also divisible by
g(x).
Generator polynomials can be specifically tailored to detect certain kinds of
errors. Consider a single error pattern represented by e(x) = x' for some i,
0 < i < n + k -1. If g(x) has more than one nonzero term, it does not divide e(x) evenly
and therefore detects all single bit errors. More errors can be detected by using a
generator with (1 + x) as a factor. The resultant CRC's will then also have (1 + x) as a
factor which always leads to an even number of terms. If g(x) and v(x) have even parity,
all odd number errors are detected. Now, consider a double error pattern
e(x) = x' + x = x(l + xi-') for some i, O i n + k - 2 andj, i +1 < j < n+ k -1. If g(x)
does not have x as a factor and if it does not evenly divide [1 + xi-'] for
1 < j- i < n + k -1, we can detect all double errors.
Another class of important errors is known as burst errors. A burst error of length
b is any error pattern for which the number of bits between the first and last error is b.
Let the generator polynomial be of the form g(x) = 1 + g1x+...+gn_x" - 1 + x n where the
coefficients g,g 2 ,...,g,, can be either 0 or 1. In other words, g(x) has a degree of n and
is not divisible by x. Any burst error of length n or less can be represented as
e(x) = x'(1 + ex+...+en,,x" - ') for some i, 0 < i < k, where the coefficients e,e 2 ,. .. ,e_
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can be either 0 or 1. Such a polynomial is not evenly divisible by g(x), and therefore a
burst of n bits can be detected. Now consider a burst error of length (n + 1) represented
by e(x) = x(1 + elx+...+en_lx,_l + ex"). Of the 2-' possible error patterns of this form,
only one, e(x) = x'g(x), is undetectable. Therefore, the probability of an undetected burst
error of length (n + 1)is only 2- n-1) . A similar analysis finds that the fraction of
undetected burst errors of length greater than (n + 1) is 2 - .
The above description covers only one of the many capabilities that CRC's can
provide. Generator polynomials can also be chosen to allow certain errors to actually be
corrected. The problem is that deriving these error-correcting codes becomes very
complicated and time-consuming when expanded to a large number of bits. CRC's
normally do not go beyond 32 bits (16 bits is the most common length). In order to test
the viability of using 64-bit signatures for the reliability reasons mentioned in Section
4.3.2, a 64-bit generator polynomial needs to be derived. Since the only purpose for
CRC's in this proposed architecture is to detect errors and thus active faults, determining
the generator polynomial concentrated only on error detection properties. The optimal
structure of such a n-bit generator polynomial is
s(x) = (x + 1)(1 + pix+...+pn_x- ), (4.6)
where the (1 + pIx+...+p_, x-' ) term is a primitive polynomial. A polynomial of degree
m is primhitive if and only if it divides Xn -1 for no n less than q - 1 and is an
irreducible polynomial in that it is not divisible by any polynomial of degree less than m
but is greater than zero [PW72]. The (x + 1) term allows the polynomial to detect all odd
number errors while the (n - 1)"' order primitive polynomial increases the size of
messages for which double errors can be detected. E. J. Watson in [Wat62] compiled a
list of primitive polynomials of degree n, 1 < n < 100. The primitive polynomial of
degree 63 multiplied by (x + 1) gives the following generator polynomial:
s(x) = (x + 1)(1 + X63) = 1 + x2 + X63 + X64. (4.7)
4.52. CRC Implementation Techniques
One of the main advantages of using CRC's to encode messages is the ease of
implementing the function. Traditionally, CRC's have been done in hardware using a
simple shift register to process the data bit by bit. Software implementations though have
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found handling the message on a byte- or even word-level to be easier and faster. This
section gives a simplistic description of how to compute CRC's in hardware. A much
more in-depth look into the issues involved in hardware implementation can be found in
[Gal90] or [Lee81]. Software CRC algorithms are then covered in more detail since the
proposed architecture involves one of these choices.
Generating CRC's in hardware can be done using very basic, low-level circuitry.
The computation of CRC's involves the modulo-two division of the message by a
generator polynomial in order to calculate the remainder. The hardware equivalent of a
modulo-two division is a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). Figure 4.10 shows the
LFSR circuit for the CRC-16 generator polynomial. To encode the message, the circuit is
first initialized with a seed value, usually all zeros or ones for error detection purposes.
The message is then fed into the register from the right, bit by bit. The bits remaining in
the register when the message has gone completely through are the CRC. Decoding
operates in the same manner, with the message and appended CRC being entered into the
register. If the remainder is zero, no errors have occurred. The biggest advantage of
using hardware for calculating CRC's is in performance. Messages can be encoded by a
shift register "on-the-fly", or in parallel with other processing, causing little extra delay.
The problem is that specific hardware dedicated to generating CRC's goes against our
design and cost goals of providing a software-based architecture.
g(x) =16 +X15 + 2 + Message for encodingMessage + CRC for decoding
Figure 4.10 LFSR circuit for the CRC-16 generator polynomial.
The technique used by a LFSR to process the message bit by bit is easily
performed in software. The problem is that the sequential nature of software prevents
generating the CRC with computation on-the-fly. A delay is present, adding to
performance overhead, whenever a message is signed and verified. Even worse, this
delay increases as the size of the message grows. This latency has caused software
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algorithms to move away from processing data bit by bit to handling it as bytes or even
words. Generating CRC's in larger blocks speeds up performance by decreasing the
number of times CRC operations are needed.
Using bytes and words instead of bits removes a number of unnecessary steps in
finding a CRC, but the calculations that are left still take time. A faster alternative is to
precompute the values for different seeds and place them into a CRC lookup table. The
largest timing overhead is therefore moved to a one-time delay during initialization.
Once the table values have been computed, the CRC for a message is calculated using
constant size blocks with the following steps:
1. Initialize a CRC register the size of the desired digital signature to all
zeros.
2. EXOR the input block with the value in the register.
3. Shift the CRC register once to the right for each bit in the input block.
4. Look up the value corresponding to the block in the CRC register and
EXOR the CRC register with it.
5. Repeat steps 2 to 4 until the end of the message is reached.
This technique requires only shifts, a table lookup, and two EXOR's for each block of
data.
The different options for using CRC lookup tables balance performance
requirements against storage capabilities. The number of entries in the lookup table
depends on the block size used by the algorithm, requiring 2' entries for a e-bit block. A
bytewise table algorithm requires twice as many lookups as an algorithm using short
words (16 bits), but only needs 256 (28) entries versus 65,535 (216) entries. If memory is
a definite restriction, a reduced lookup table can be used. The reduced lookup table
contains an entry for each bit in a data block where that bit equals one and the other bits
are zeros. The values found in the full tables are then calculated using sums of the entries
in the reduced table, depending on which bits are set in the seed. This method requires e
entries for a e-bit block, but utilizes additional operations to calculate the CRC, meaning
performance suffers.
With the fall in the price of memory, cost constraints no longer solely determine
how much memory is available in systems. In the proposed architecture, the main limiter
on the amount of memory is the small space requirement associated with embedded
systems. This change in emphasis has allowed designers to balance performance issues
against memory requirements, instead of concentrating solely on saving memory. Of the
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CRC lookup table options mentioned above, the reduced lookup table method uses the
least memory, but has definite performance problems. On the other hand, the space
occupied for tables with word-sized or greater blocks seems excessive. The optimal
balance of memory versus performance thus appears to be using byte-size blocks.
4.6. Protocol Implementation Results
The use of authentication introduces a new form of performance overhead to
message passing which must be thoroughly explored. Every time a message is
exchanged using authentication, it is signed by the sender and then verified by the
receiver. This process has a constant adverse effect on the performance of the system.
Therefore, the entire authentication layer needs to be implemented in software so the
various performance issues can be examined. This implementation was completed using
the C programming language and then run on a Sun workstation. Overhead
measurements were taken using timer system calls at points in the code. The use of these
calls added to the timing results, but an assumption is made that the extra overhead is
constant over the various runs.
The main determiner of the amount of overhead added by authentication is the
length of the signatures. Up to this point, the only time signature lengths were introduced
as a factor was in the discussion of signature security (See Section 4.2). In the example
given, it was found that a signature needs to consist of at least 53 bits to provide a
probability of forgery of 10-'6/message. In support of this conclusion, a 64-bit CRC
generator polynomial was derived in Section 4.5.1. The issue of signature length now
needs to be examined with performance in mind. The final decision on what length of
signature to use must balance both security and performances requirements.
The authentication protocol is built using three functions. The encoding function
generates CRC's which act as a n-bit representation of a k-bit message, where n < k. A
signing function then signs this CRC with a private key found on only one processor to
complete the digital signature. When the message reaches the receiver, the encoding
function is used again to generate the CRC of the data. The appended signature is then
combined with a public key related to the sender's private key by an authenticating
function to verify the origin and contents of the message. Constructing these functions
implements the entire protocol.
The first step in measuring performance is to implement the encoding function
using the varying length generator polynomials shown in Table 4.1. These generator
polynomials were chosen to span, in multiples of a byte, from 8 to 64 bits. The LRCC-8
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polynomial is a LRC (Longitudinal Redundancy Code) normally used for simple parity
checks such as a mod-2 sum of bytes. The CRC-16 polynomial is used all over the
world, found in such protocols as the Bisync (binary synchronous) protocol, while the
Ethernet polynomial is employed in local area networks [RG88]. Implementing the
protocol's functions with these polynomials allows a comparison of the performance
tradeoffs involved in the different lengths of signatures.
Title Generator Polynomial
LRCC-8 x8 + 1
CRC-16 x16 + x + x2 + 1
Ethernet x32 + x26 + X23 + x22 + xl6 + 2 + X1l
+X10 +X8 +X7 + X + 4 +2 + + 1
64-bit X64 + X63 + x2 + 1
Table 4.1 List of varying length generator polynomials.
The various implementation techniques for generating CRC's are discussed in
Section 4.5.2. The final choice for this architecture is a CRC lookup table using one-byte
input blocks. This method fulfills the requirement of implementing functionality in
software while providing the best balance of performance optimization versus memory
needs. An important property of using these CRC lookup tables is that a large amount of
performance overhead is moved to an initialization period when the entries in the CRC
lookup table are calculated. Table 4.2 compares the different properties of varying
generator polynomials during this CRC initialization interval. The performance overhead
due to initialization remains relatively constant for the first three generator polynomials.
The only significant time difference comes when the generator polynomial is lengthened
to 64 bits. Determining the memory overhead involves multiplying the number of entries
in the table (256) by the number of bytes in each entry. This means that memory
Generator Initialization Memory Probability of Forgery
Polynomial Overhead (usec) Overhead (Bytes) (per message)
LRCC-8 620 256 .0039
CRC-16 650 512 .000015
Ethernet 629 1024 2.33x10- '0
64-bit 795 2048 5.42x10-20
Table 4.2 Implementation properties of CRC initialization.
45
overhead is doubled each time the generator polynomial is extended by a byte. The
probability of forgery is simply the probability that a digital signature is randomly forged
correctly, or 2-" for a n-bit signature. This means that there is a exponential decrease in
the probability of forgery as the length of the signature grows.
The most important performance overhead in generating CRC's is the time needed
to actually calculate the final CRC for each message. This time is dependent on the
length of both the signature and the message. Section 4.5.2 describes the steps necessary
to encode a message using a CRC lookup table. Figure 4.11 plots the timing
measurements for generating varying length signatures for k-bit messages, with k
increasing exponentially at a rate of 2i for i = 1...10. Two important facts are apparent
from this graph. First of all, the time necessary to generate CRC's of all lengths increases
linearly as the messages become longer. Secondly, the overhead associated with CRC's
of 8, 16, and 32 bits is basically the same while the overhead for the 64-bit CRC's jumps
significantly higher, becoming almost twice as much at points. This result is explained
by the fact that the machine used to run the CRC code operates on 32-bit long word
boundaries. The arithmetic for 32 bits or less involves the same operations, while the 64-
bit operation take twice as many computations.
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Figure 4.11 Message encoding performance overhead.
The only difference between the signing and authenticating functions are the keys
used in generating the final result. Both functions are implemented using a combined
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multiply and modulus function. The signing function multiplies a n-bit CRC by a n-bit
private key, keeping the last n-bits as the final signature. The authenticating function
takes this signature and multiplies it by a n-bit public key, keeping the last n-bits to
compare with the CRC of the message to verify its origin and contents. For the first three
digital signature lengths, the code for these functions is very simple. When a variable of
a specific length is assigned the product of two variables of the same length, a modulus
function is implied. Therefore, the only code needed is a multiplication statement. This
technique works so long as the signature length is equal to or less than the machine's
word boundaries. Implementing the 64-bit signing/authenticating function on a machine
operating on 32-bit boundaries is more complicated. Long multiplication must be carried
out in units of 16-bits, with careful tallying of the carries. Table 4.3 shows the overheads
for the different signing/authentication functions. Once again, the overhead associated
with digital signatures of one, two, and four bytes is relatively equal. The added
complexity of the 64-bit function is confirmed by the significant amount of extra
overhead involved.
Generator Polynomial Signing/Authenticating
Overhead (usec)
LRCC-8 18
CRC-16 20
Ethernet 20
64-bit 56
Table 4.3 Signing/authenticating performance overhead.
Deciding the best signature length for use in the proposed architecture involves a
tradeoff between reliability and performance. As the example in Section 4.2 shows, any
decision based completely on minimizing the probability of a forged signature going
undetected would choose a length of 64 bits. The problem is that the process of
generating the 64-bit signature has definite performance problems on today's computers.
It is perfectly reasonable to expect a processor to be able to perform 32-bit multiplication
in one line of code, but 64-bit multiplication is part of the future. The performance
overhead introduced by authentication, found with every message exchanged, is too
significant to be ignored. The optimal choice for signature length is therefore 32 bits
which has a probability of forgery of 2.33xl0 - '/message while minimizing the amount
of time needed to sign and authenticate messages. In addition to using the 32-bit
signature length, the operations used by the functions making up the authentication
47
protocol need to be optimized as much as possible. The computations needed by each
routine are simple enough to make writing their code in the assembly language of the
processor upon which the system is running viable.
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5. Interactive Consistency
5.1. Overview
The interactive consistency algorithm is found in the Message Passing Layer, the
layer responsible for distributing all data between processors. Specifically, this protocol
implements exchange functions which pass single-source information to all nonfaulty
processors such that the Byzantine Agreement conditions discussed in Section 3.3 hold in
the presence of Byzantine faults. The final design needs to balance the goal of providing
a low-cost architecture against having reasonable performance capabilities.
This chapter first examines in detail the many requirements which must be
fulfilled by the interactive consistency protocol. The next step is to explore the
algorithms which provide the desired properties and any design issues associated with
implementing the algorithms. The final section contains an outline of the final proposed
protocol design, including algorithms for the routines which make up the protocol.
5.2. Interactive Consistency Requirements
An accusation leveled against Byzantine resilient architectures is that the level of
complexity necessary to mask possible faults is too expensive and complicated.
Surprisingly, the requirements needed to provide interactive consistency in the presence
of Byzantine faults are quite straight forward. First of all, the designer chooses the
number of faults,f, that the system needs to be able to withstand. Once this decision is
made, the requirements are unambiguous functions of this parameter. The only other
factor that affects these results is whether or not digital signatures are used. Since
authentication is an integral part of this design, all of the bounds discussed below assume
that messages are signed.
The amount of hardware necessary in a Byzantine resilient system is determined
byf. When authentication is used, it is possible to reach interactive consistency among
all nonfaulty processors so long as the total number of processors in the system, N, is
such that N > f [LSP82]. This bound is usually increased to N > 2f + 1 to provide a
majority of nonfaulty processors. Without a majority, the system operates correctly in
that the Byzantine Agreement conditions given in Section 3.3 are fulfilled, but there is no
way of telling from outside the system which processors are correct. An additional
hardware requirement is that there always exist at least one path between a pair of
nonfaulty processors that does not depend on a faulty processor. For a system using the
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majority processor bound of N > 2f + 1, this means that each processor must be
connected to every other processor by at least f + 1 disjoint paths. Figure 5. l(a) shows
how one fault could prevent interactive consistency with the correct number of processors
but not enough connectivity. With only one path between processors A and C, a faulty
processor B could block delivery of messages between the two nonfaulty processors. The
configuration shown in Figure 5.1(b) solves this problem by adding a second path
between processors A and C which bypasses processor B.
(a) Connectivity of one. (b) Connectivity of two.
Figure 5.1 Connectivity requirement.
The third interactive consistency requirement must be provided by the message
passing algorithm implemented by the protocol. Each interactive consistency exchange
must consist of at least f + 1 rounds, where rounds are defined as an interval of time in
which processors chosen by the algorithm transmit messages to other processors and all
processors read any values arriving on their links [DS83]. This requirement is necessary
to mask faults such as the "two-faced" clock shown in Figure 3.2. The sender fault is not
detected until the second round when the nonfaulty processors exchange the values that
they received in the first round. Also, if the fault is not at the sender, the f + 1 rounds
guarantee that at least one correct message will arrive at the other nonfaulty processors
over the (f + 1)th disjoint path from the sender. The final requirement says that all of the
nonfaulty processors must be synchronized to within a known skew of each other. The
mechanics of providing synchronized clocks are implemented by the clock
synchronization protocol discussed in Chapter 7. For now, the interactive consistency
protocol is designed assuming that the synchronized clocks are present.
The number of faults that the system must mask determines the size and
complexity of a Byzantine resilient system. The first fault scenario which must be
examined is a specific number of faults occurring simultaneously. This is the quantity,f,
which provides the lower bounds described above. Increasingf is an expensive
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proposition. Designing a system to mask two simultaneous faults instead only one
requires five processors with a connectivity of three versus three processors and a
connectivity of two. Figure 5.2 illustrates the difference in complexity caused by
increasing the number of simultaneous faults that are protected against by just one.
(a) One fault. (b) Two simultaneous faults.
Figure 5.2 Protecting against an increasing number of simultaneous faults.
One of the main advantages of using an authenticated protocol for interactive
consistency is the graceful manner in which the system can degrade. If fact, the protocol
fulfills tie Byzantine Agreement conditions even if only one processor remains
nonfaulty. If the surviving processor gets conflicting data, it simply chooses a default
value. In a practical system which needs to provide information to external entities (i.e.,
directions to a flight control system), more care is needed. First of all, the original system
must contain enough processors to meet the majority processor bound of N > 2f + 1. If
more thanf simultaneous faults occur, the system fails. Iff or fewer faults appear at the
same time, each faulty processor and its adjoining links need to be isolated from the rest
of the system. The goal is to always keep a majority of nonfaulty processors. So long as
more than one processor remains nonfaulty, majority decisions can still be made if
another processor becomes faulty. When only two processors are left and they are in
conflict, additional steps, usually external, are needed to decide which processor is faulty
and remove it from the system.
One of the motivations behind designing the subject system is to provide a low-
cost alternative to pre-existing Byzantine resilient systems. This need for low-cost
pushes the design towards using the minimal configuration shown in Figure 5.2(a). If a
processor becomes faulty, it can be removed from the system while the remaining two
processors continue to provide interactive consistency. If another processor starts
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exhibiting faulty behavior, the sole nonfaulty processor will continue to operate correctly,
but the fault must be isolated before any external decisions can be made.
5.3. Byzantine Agreement Algorithms
Lamport, Shostak, and Pease provided an algorithm, called SM(m), for achieving
Byzantine Agreement using authentication in [LSP82]. This algorithm has since been
optimized and expanded for different situations, but is still the foundation of work in this
area. The algorithm is given below exactly as found in [LSP82]. The commander refers
to the processor which is actually sending the message while the lieutenants are the
processors receiving the message. Basically, in the first round, the general signs his
message and sends it to all of his lieutenants. The lieutenants then add their signatures
and relay the message to everyone who has not signed it yet. The algorithm is stated
more precisely below, letting x:i denote a value signed by processor i and Vi be the final
set of values.
(a) First round. (b) Second round.
Figure 5.3 Message passing using SM(m).
Algorithm SM(m) [LSP82]
Initially, Vi = ( .
(1) The commander signs and sends his value to every lieutenant.
(2) For each i,
(A) If Lieutenant i receives a message of the form v:O from the commander
and he has not yet received any order, then
(i) he lets Vi equal {v};
(ii) he send the message v:O:i to every other lieutenant.
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(B) If Lieutenant i receives a message of the form v:O: jl: 2: ...: i and v is not
in the set Vi, then
(i) he adds v to Vi;
(ii) if k < m, then he sends the message v:O:jl:j2 :...:jk:i to every
lieutenant other than j,..., j.
(3) For each i: When the Lieutenant i will receive no more messages, he obeys the
order, choice(Vi).
An improved version of this algorithm developed by Dolev and Strong in [DS83]
uses certain characteristics of digital signatures to give a specific instantiation for the
choice() function used in deciding the final value. Authentication allows a processor to
discover whether a message has been corrupted since leaving the sender and restricts
undetected faults to passive ones such as a failure to relay messages. The new algorithm
discards all messages that:
1) do not match their signatures,
2) do not have the sender as the first signature, or
3) carry values the same as those already seen.
If, during (f + 1)"' round, a processor extracts a value, the otherf processors are faulty
and all of the nonfaulty processors now receive a correct value. If at the end of f + 1
rounds, a processor has only extracted one value, all of the nonfaulty processors have that
value. If any of the nonfaulty processors have extracted two values, all of the nonfaulty
processors have extracted two and decide on a sender fault.
5.4. Interactive Consistency Design Issues
The actual implementation of the above algorithm and decision-strategy must take
into account a number of different issues. The information provided by the interactive
consistency protocol can be used for other purposes than simply fulfilling the Byzantine
Agreement requirements. If the design is done correctly, much of the data needed by a
Fault Detection, Identification, and Recovery (FDIR) task to detect where faults are
occurring can be recovered from the message passing intervals. Also, a greater emphasis
needs to be placed on performance issues other than the total number of messages sent by
the protocol, taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the architecture. These
issues bring to light some design options which need to be examined. Decisions must be
53
made on the type of message passing to be used, the number of signatures which are
appended to messages, the format for each message, and how to keep track of sequence
numbers.
5.4.1. Message Passing
Much of the work in developing new Byzantine resilient protocols has been in
finding algorithms which use the least number of messages to achieve agreement. An
example of such an optimization is found in SM(m) where, after the first round, the
processors only relay a message to those that have not already signed it. In previous
Draper Byzantine resilient systems, the time taken by a message passing protocol is
determined by the number of rounds utilized. Since the processors are all connected via
disjoint paths with separate message processing hardware provided for fault tolerance, the
number of messages within a given round do not affect the latency of the overall system.
So long as the lower bound of f + 1 rounds is met by the protocol, little can be done to
optimize the speed of the interactive consistency exchanges. Therefore, in these
hardware-based architectures, the extra hardware required to decide which processors
need to send messages each round actually hurts performance. Instead, a broadcast
protocol, where each processor automatically sends a message to all other processors and
then only uses those messages that it needs, requires less overhead and provides more
flexibility to the system.
Broadcast protocols have a number of advantages over the sending of messages
on a point-to-point basis suggested by SM(m). In a mission-critical system where the
sender is trying to distribute important information, every attempt must be made to
overcome what may be a transient fault. A broadcast protocol allows the system more
versatility in recovering from a sender fault as well as isolating faults. For example, if the
nonfaulty processors all receive corrupted data from the sender in the first round and then
valid data in the second, the fault is probably transient and the default decision should be
to request retransmission of the information. The added information could also be used
for FDIR. For example, if the sender receives a null message in the second round, FDIR
would know that either a sender fault has occurred, or the fault is in the relay processor.
While the advantages from the extra information provided by a broadcast protocol
are also present in a software-based architecture, the performance payoff does not
necessarily translate. When the message processing for each link is done in separate
hardware, the work can be completed in parallel. In software, the processing tasks for
each message must be completed sequentially. Therefore, the number of messages sent
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during a round has some kind of adverse effect on performance. Whether this added
latency outweighs the benefits provided by a broadcast protocol is a question that must be
answered by the implementation.
5.4.2. Signature Configuration
Another design tradeoff between performance and extra information is deciding
the number of signatures to append to messages. The SM(m) algorithm uses "nested
signatures," where each relay processor places its own signature on the end of the
message, to perform message reducing optimizations. The processors check the
signatures already included in the message to decide which processors to relay the
message to in the next round. In a small fully connected system such as the proposed
minimal configuration, these extra signatures are not really needed for the correct
operation of the protocol. So long as the sender signs the message and each processor
can tell where every message comes from, the algorithm still provides consistency. The
decision about whether to use nested signatures must be based on other issues.
(a) Isolating a sender fault.
(i) O:A OA:B(
(b) Isolating a relay fault.
Figure 5.4 Using nested signatures to isolate faults.
The prime advantage in using nested signatures appears when a fault occurs. If
the fault is active, such as data corruption, the added signatures can be used to help isolate
the location of a fault. The receiving node can attempt to pinpoint where the problem
transpired by peeling off the signatures and checking them against the message until it
reaches one that does not match. Figure 5.4 shows how a processor would try to discover
where a fault has occurred. In Figure 5.4(a), the message is corrupted by the sender,
processor A, and then correctly relayed by processor B. When processor C receives the
message and attempts to authenticate it using the two signatures, processor A's signature
fails to verify the contents of the message, while processor B's signature is correct. Since
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processor B's signature is correct, processor C then knows that the fault occurred before
the message arrived at processor B and therefore must have happened at processor A. In
Figure 5.4(b), the message is sent correctly by processor A and then corrupted by
processor B. When processor C receives the message and attempts to authenticate it
using the two signatures, neither one of the signatures verifies if the data corruption
occurs before processor B's signature. Processor C then knows only that the fault
occurred at or before processor B. This information can be used by a FDIR task to help
determine the overall status of the system.
The main disadvantage of nested protocols is the effect on performance. For a
system of N processors, each message has (N - 1) signatures to authenticate by the last
round. When combined with the added latency of signing and sending longer messages,
these effects could become prohibitive. There are steps that can be taken to reduce the
time needed for processing the extra signatures using the technique shown in Figure 5.5.
If the CRC calculated in verifying the received message is kept, a new CRC can be
generated using the old CRC as a seed and then feeding any additional bytes such as the
last signature through the generator. In Figure 5.5(a), the CRC for the first signature is
generated using all zeros for the initial seed value and then feeding the majority of the
message, including the message header, data, and previous trailer information, through
the register. In Figure 5.5(b), the CRC for the second signature is generated using the
previous CRC for its initial seed value and then feeding the first signature and any
additional trailer information through the register. This same trick can be used to speed
up verifying multiple signatures.
An option that could utilize the advantages of both nested and single signatures is
to provide different levels of service within the operating system. Since the main purpose
of the architecture is to provide a real-time Byzantine resilient system, the default would
be having a single signature from the sender. This option avoids the extra penalties of
signing, sending, and verifying multiple signatures and yet still provides the needed
consistency. If a fault is detected or upon a periodic basis, the system could move up a
level to using nested signatures. The chief purpose of these messages would be to isolate,
and hopefully recover, a faulty processor (or link) before another fault occurs. The new
messages would take longer to process, but would provide more information for FDIR,
making the entire process of recovering from faults faster. A third level of service could
be provided for applications where speed is more important than fault tolerance, by
removing authentication. This level would not be able to survive malicious faults though
and the system would basically become a triply redundant processor.
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CRC for Message HeaderSignatfr 00100100100 C +Message
Signature O + Previous Trailer
Initial CRC Register Information
(a) Generating first signature using all zeros for the seed.
CRC for Signature 0
Signature CR0 1 1 + AdditionalTrailer Information
CRC Register after processing
CRC for Signature 0
(b) Generating second signature using previous CRC for the seed.
Figure 5.5 Generating nested signatures.
5.4.3. Message Format
The format of each message must be designed to incorporate a number of
different options. The choice() function used by the interactive consistency protocol uses
CRC's as its arguments to generate its final value. All of the information necessary to
fulfill the implementation requirements for the interactive consistency protocol and to
perform synchronization must be included in the message without affecting this choice()
function. Finally, the format must be ordered so that the nested signaturing scheme
discussed in the previous section can be performed. All of these requirements must be
combined in such a way that the added length to the message is minimized, since
processing the extra information is added to the overhead.
All of the needed information must be placed in either a header which precedes
the actual data or a trailer which is appended to the end of the message. Figure 5.6 shows
a format using 64-bit signatures which fulfills all of the necessary conditions. The only
information which is placed in the header is the message's size and type (i.e., From_a,
From_all, Voting, etc.). This information is invariant in that it is the same on every
processor. This means that CRC's of the headers and data for each copy of a message
received by the processor can be compared by the choice() function. All of the variant
information, which is processor-specific, is placed in the trailer. This includes a sequence
number to fulfill the time-specific authentication requirement mentioned in Section 4.2 as
well as a timestamp for use in synchronization. After the timestamp, a processor ID is
placed in the trailer to identify which processor is generating the signature which follows.
This part of the trailer can be expanded to include as many processor ID's and signatures
as necessary.
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Figure 5.6 Proposed message format using 64-bit signatures.
The important characteristic of this format is that it is possible to authenticate
each nested signature without having to process any byte in the message more than once.
A message is authenticated in three steps. First, the CRC of the invariant information is
calculated using zeros for a seed. This information is saved for use as an argument of the
choice() function and then placed as the seed to generate the next CRC. The sequence
number, timestamp, and processor ID for the first signature are then fed through the CRC
generation routine to get the CRC for authenticating the first signature. The first
signature and the second processor ID are then feed through the CRC routine, using the
previous CRC for a seed, to get the CRC needed to authenticate the second signature.
This process can be expanded to more signatures if required and minimizes the overhead
necessary for authenticating nested signatures.
5.4.4. Sequence Numbers
In Section 4.2, the rationale behind placing sequence numbers in each message to
prevent a relay processor from undetectably repeating an old message is explained.
Generating these sequence numbers is an easy operation which can be done by any
monotonically increasing function. Each processor keeps a record of the last sequence
number that it used and a table with the last sequence number that it received from every
other processor in the system. The structure of the interactive consistency protocol
though forces the system to take some care in recording sequence numbers from other
processors. The problem is that within each interactive consistency exchange, each
processor can receive from one to f + 1 copies of the same message from the sender, due
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to other processors relaying their own copies. If a processor updates its sequence number
table as soon as it gets the first message, it would then reject every other copy as invalid.
This could cause the protocol to not operate correctly with certain faults. Figure 5.7
shows the protocol reaching an incorrect result with the "two-faced" clock fault
mentioned in Chapter 3. During the first round, processors B and C receive valid but
different messages, both with a sequence number of 1, from processor A . Since they
update processor A's entry in their sequence number table when these messages arrive,
the messages received in the second round are found to be invalid because of their old
sequence numbers. Without these second round messages, processors B and C agree on
different values, which goes against the Byzantine Agreement requirements. The
solution is to keep a record, separate from the sequence number table, of the largest
authentic sequence number to arrive during an exchange. At the end of the exchange, this
number can then be used to update the sequence number table.
Seq_number[A] = 0 Seq_number[A] = 0 Seq_number[A] = 1 Seq_number[A] = 1
(a) First round. (b) Second round.
Figure 5.7 "Two-faced" clock with incorrect sequence number record keeping.
5.5. Final Protocol Design
Now that the various requirements and design issues have been examined, an
interactive consistency protocol capable correctly and efficiently distributing single-
source in the presence of Byzantine faults must be designed. The interactive consistency
protocol that was chosen to be implemented in our architecture is based on the extension
of SM(m) suggested by Dolev and Strong. Three separate uniprocessor exchange
routines, one for each processor, are provided to distribute single-source information. A
fourth function is used when each processor has a different version of the same data (i.e.,
each processor reads its redundant sensor). This From_all routine completes the steps
necessary for all three of the uniprocessor Fromprocessor exchanges in two round
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instead of the six required to carry out each exchange individually. The implementation
needs to include two exchange formats:
1) exchanges with nested signatures and the point-to-point message passing
used by SM(m), and
2) exchanges with only the sender's signature broadcast message passing.
The performance effects of using nested signatures or broadcasts can then be examined to
decide whether the advantages given by the extra information outweigh the costs of
providing it.
A exchange routines were designed assuming that the synchronization layer was
already in place. The details of synchronization are discussed in Chapter 7, but the basic
purpose of the protocol is to provide synchronized clocks which fulfill the following
conditions [Sch87]:
Virtual Synchronization: Local clocks, (t), on each processors are
synchronized to within a known skew, 6, such that:
q (t) - p(t) < , for 0 < t. (5.1)
Virtual Clock Rate: Local clocks, (t), drift from real time at a rate bound by a
constant, 3, such that:
_ < p(t+ )-(t) < 1+3, for 0<t. (5.2)
The maximum message transmission delay constant, F,,, is combined with the skew, 6,
to determine the length of the individual rounds within the algorithms. This time limit is
only an estimate. The length of the rounds in the actual implementation are also
influenced by the time that is takes for the messages to be processed after they arrive.
Each processor uses a buffer space to process out-going and incoming messages.
This buffer space consists of a 3x3 array of individual buffers, each containing memory
to store a message, its arrival time, and associated CRC's, as well as a Verify Flag (VF).
Figure 5.8(a) shows a single buffer. The Verify Flag (VF) is set when a message is
correctly authenticated and is used at the end of the exchange to decide on the final value.
The arrival time of a message at the processor is saved for use in synchronization. There
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are two classes of CRC's which are also stored: invariant CRC's, which are CRC's of
only the header and message and are the same on all processors, and variant CRC's which
include noncongruent information such as sequence numbers, timestamps, and processor
ID's. The invariant CRC's are used by the choice() function to decide on a final value at
the end of an exchange, while the variant CRC's are used to speed up the process of
calculating nested signatures (See the previous section for a discussion of this technique).
Figure 5.8(b) shows a simplified version of the entire buffer space. Each processor has
space for its own out-going message during first round and incoming messages from the
other two processors. A space for each uniprocessor interactive consistency exchange is
needed because the multiprocessor interactive consistency exchange (From_all)
implements all three of the exchanges at once.
(a) Individual buffer.
From A From B FromC
Processor A Message Buffer VF Message Buffer VF Message Buffer IVF
Processor B Message Buffer VF Message Buffer VF1 Message Buffer VF
Processor C Message Buffer VFI Message Buffer VF Message Buffer IVF
(b) Interactive consistency buffer space.
Figure 5.8 Interactive consistency exchange buffers.
The following sections contain descriptions of both the uniprocessor (Froma,
From_b, and From_c) and multiprocessor (From_all) routines which implement the
interactive consistency protocol. The algorithms outline the steps taken within each
function with a strict separation between the two message passing rounds. In the final
implementation, this separation will not be so sharp, because the routine must be able to
handle messages from the second round arriving early while still rejecting late messages
from the first round. Various details of how nested signatures are computed are included
as well as how the choice() function given by Dolev and Strong is carried out by
comparing the invariant CRC's of the messages. The provided algorithms are for the
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most complicated form of the implementation: interactive consistency exchanges with
nested signatures and broadcasts.
5.5.1. Uniprocessor Interactive Consistency Exchange ( From_a, From_b, and From_c)
Single-source exchanges are used when only one processor has single-source
information to distribute. Figure 5.9 shows the message passing during and the buffer
space after a From_a exchange using nested signatures and broadcasts and with no faults.
In the first round, the sender (processor A) transmits a signed message to the other
processors while the other processors send out signed NULL messages. When received,
only the sender's messages are authenticated (setting the VF flag if the message verifies)
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(a) First round.
Figure 5.9 From_a message passing
(b) Second round.
and buffer space at end of rounds.
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while the NULL messages are ignored. In the second round, each processor adds its own
signature to the end of the sender's message and transmits it to the other processors. The
processors only authenticate messages which are not from the sender, but have the
sender's signature as the first signature. When the message passing is done, each
processor has at least two verified copies of the message whose invariant CRC's (saved
from the authentication process) can be compared to protect against sender faults.
5.5.1.1. Uniprocessor Interactive Consistency Exchange Algorithm
On processor i,
First round:
Begin first round at local time, 'i(tgin)
Send messages:
Erase all buffers.
If (Sender)
Place message in correct buffer, leaving room for header at
the beginning.
Fill in header (Message size and message type (From_sender)).
Place sequence number, timestamp, and processor ID in trailer.
Compute variant CRC and sign with private key.
Place signature in trailer.
Send message to all other processors.
Receive messages:
While ( I (t)- -(tbin )1< (6 + rmaix))
If (Receive message)
Place in correct buffer (using the link that the
message arrives on and the message type).
if (Message from sender, has valid sequence
number, has only one signature, and is of the correct
type)
I
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Authenticate signature, saving invariant and
variant CRC's.
if (Message verifies)
Set VF flag.
Get and save arrival time.
Second Round:
Begin second round at local time, i (tbegn + 6+ Fmu).
Send messages:
If (Have message from sender)
Fill in additional trailer information for second signature
(processor ID) on the end of message.
Compute second signature using CRC based on variant
CRC from first round plus processor ID and first signature
and then signing with private key.
Send message to all other processors.
Receive messages:
While ((Iij(t) - Ci(tgi)l> ( + Fr.)) and
(Iei (t) - ¢ (tbEgi)I <2(3 + r.x))
If ( Receive message),
If (Message from sender)
Dump message.
Else
Put in correct buffer.
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If (Message has two signatures, has a valid
sequence number, its first signature is from
sender, and is of correct type)
Authenticate message, saving
invariant CRC.
If (Message Verifies)
Set VF flag.
Get and save arrival time.
Message Processing:
Choose correct final value using VF flag and invariant CRC's:
If (Only 1 verified message)
Choose message.
If ((2 verified messages) and (CRC1 = CRC2))
Choose either message.
if ((2 verified messages) and (CRC1 CRC2))
Choose default (NULL).
5.5.2. Multi-Source Interactive Consistency Exchange (From_all)
The multi-source interactive consistency exchange is used when each processor has
noncongruent information which needs to be distributed (i.e., readings from redundant
sensors). The algorithm basically implements a From_a, From_b, and From_c at the
same time, only taking two rounds instead of the six needed to do each individually.
Three buffer spaces with room for three messages are used to keep the information
separate. Figure 5.10 shows the message passing during and the buffer space after a
From_all exchange using nested signatures and broadcasts and with no faults.
65
X:A
From a
Processor A Processor A
From b From c From a From h From c
X:A I
X:B 4
X:C `
Processor B
From a From b From c
X:A 
X:B 
1 1 c 
Processor C
From a From b From c
X:A I
X:B 4
i X:C 4
(a) First round.
Processor A
Processor i
Processor C
Processor A
Processor B
Processor C
Processor A
Processor B
Processor C
X:A 4
X:A:B I X:B:A _ X:C:B [4
X:A:C 4 X:B:C 4 X:C:A 4
Processor B
From a From b From c
X:A:B I X:B:A I X:C:A 4
X:B 4
X:A:C X:B:C I X:C:B `4
Processor C
From a From b From c
X:A:C ` X:B:A I XC:A `
X:A:B 4 X:B:C 4 X:C:B 4
(b) Second round.
Figure 5.10 From_all message passing and buffer space at end of rounds.
Multiorocessor Interactive Consistencv Exchansie Aleorithm
On processor i,
First Round:
Begin first round at local time, C,(ti,,).
Send messages:
Erase all buffers.
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Place message in correct buffer leaving room for header at the
beginning.
Fill in header (Message size and message type (From_all).
Place sequence number, timestamp, and processor ID in trailer.
Compute variant CRC and sign with private key.
Place signature in trailer.
Send message to all other processors.
Receive messages:
While ( I i(t) - (tbgi )1< (3 + rmax))
If (Receive message)
Place in temporary buffer.
If(Message is from the original sender, has a valid
sequence number, is of the correct type, and only
has one signature)
{
Place in correct buffer in correct buffer
space (use processor ID of first signature to
choose buffer space).
Authenticate signature, saving variant and
invariant CRC's.
If(Message Verifies)
Set VF flag.
Get and save arrival time.
Second Round:
Begin second round at local time, i(tbgi + + r ).
Send messages:
for( Each processor, i)
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If (Have message from processor i)
{
Fill in additional trailer information for 2nd
signature (processor ID) on the end of message.
Compute second signature using CRC based on
variant CRC from first round plus processor ID and
first signature and then signing with private key.
Send message to all other processors.
Receive messages:
While (( I(t) - ai(tbegi)l> (S + rm.x)) and
(I i (t)- i (tbegin)l< 2(3 + rmX ))
If ( Receive message)
{
Place message in temporary buffer.
If (Message is not from the original sender, has a
valid sequence number, and is of the correct type)
Place in correct buffer, using processor ID's
from the two signatures.
Authenticate message, saving invariant
CRC.
If (Message Verifies)
Set VF flag.
Get and save arrival time.
Else
Dump message
}
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Message Processing:
Choose correct final value for each sender:
for (Each processor)
{
If (Only 1 verified message from sender)
Choose message.
If ((2 verified messages from sender) and (CRC1 = CRC2))
Choose either message.
if ((2 verified messages from sender) and (CRC1 CRC2))
Choose default (NULL).
5.5.3. Implementation Results
Certain questions about the interactive consistency protocol cannot be answered
until part of the architecture is implemented in code. The protocol design suggested that
two exchange formats be implemented in order to investigate the tradeoffs of using
nested signatures instead of only the sender's signature or using broadcast versus point to
point message passing. Both nested signatures and message broadcasts provide more
information to the system, especially for FDIR. The problem is that both techniques
adversely affect the performance of the system. An implementation can be used to
examine the extent of this added overhead. This implementation was completed using
the C programming language and then run on a Sun workstation. Overhead
measurements were taken using timer system calls at points in the code. The use of these
calls added to the timing results, but an assumption is made that the extra overhead is
constant over the various runs.
The final implementation differs from the exchange algorithms of the previous
section in one important way. The algorithms have a strict separation between the
responsibilities of the two rounds in that the relay messages are not sent nor accepted
until the second round begins. In the actual implementation, messages are relayed and
processed as soon as they arrive. A check is made on incoming messages to remove late
arriving messages from the previous round, but early arriving messages do not affect the
outcome of the message exchange. The reasoning behind this filtering is explained in
depth in Chapter 7, but in brief, the only way a faulty processor can undetectably affect
the timing of the message exchanges is to hold onto messages, making them late.
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The performance overhead introduced by nested signatures is present throughout
all of the interactive consistency exchanges, while the issue of using broadcast message
passing is only relevant for the single-source exchanges. For this reason, the performance
measurements are taken using the single-source From_a routine. Also, there is one area
in the implemented protocol where the effects of the extra message processing are readily
apparent. This point occurs during the first round of message passing while the
processors are waiting for messages to arrive. When a message is received, the processor
authenticates the signature(s), appends a second signature if nested signatures are being
used, and then relays the message to one or two processors, depending on whether
broadcasts are being employed. The routine must be able to finish processing the first
round messages before the round ends. The performance overhead measurements
therefore concentrate on this part of the exchange.
With the optimizations explained in Section 5.4.2 for generating nested
signatures, using a nested protocol should add very little to the overhead of processing
messages. When messages arrive, they are authenticated by generating a variant CRC of
the header, message, and the first part of the trailer (which contains the sequence number,
timestamp, and the originating processor's ID), multiplying the signature by a public key,
and comparing the two results. In the buffer shown in Figure 5.8(a), a space has been
provided to save this variant CRC. Generating a second signature involves using this
variant CRC for a seed and feeding the first signature and the relay processor's ID
through the encoding function, before signing it with the relay processor's private key.
With the message format shown in Figure 5.6, this means that only 12 additional bytes
need to be processed. Figure 5.11 shows the performance overhead involved in
processing a message which arrives from the sender during the first round. An interesting
result is that the time needed to receive the message, add the second signature, and then
send the new message to the relay processor remains constant for varying length
messages. As expected, little of the total overhead is spent adding the second signature.
When compared to the time needed to send messages which takes close to 500
microseconds, the 60 or so microseconds of nested signature overhead is insignificant.
The total overhead is greater than the sum of these three measurements due to the time
needed to authenticate the first signature, plus scheduling on the Sun workstation.
The use of broadcast message passing has two major effects on the part of the
protocol being examined. First of all, each relay processor must be able to handle two
messages during the first round, a message containing data from the sender and a NULL
messages from the other relay processor. The NULL messages are not authenticated, but
they cannot be dumped because the receiving processor must check to be sure that the
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Figure 5.11 Nested signature performance overhead.
message is not an early second round message. Secondly, once the sender's message has
been authenticated, the relay processor must send it to both processors instead of just to
the other relay processor. Figure 5.12 shows the performance overhead involved in
processing a message from the sender when broadcasts are being used. The effects of
having to send this second message are immediately obvious. The system call overhead
attributed to sending messages has increased from the 500 microseconds found with the
point to point message passing used in Figure 5.11 to around 700 microseconds. Once
again, the total overhead is greater than the sum of these three measurements due to the
time needed to authenticate the first signature, plus scheduling on the Sun workstation.
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
I-- ' -I 
III ill II! III ... I.. I_ II!
0 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024
Bytes
Figure 5.12 Broadcast message passing performance overhead.
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A number of conclusions can be drawn from the above performance
measurements. First of all, any optimizations which can be done on the I/VO system calls
need to be incorporated into any final implementation. These system calls provide the
interface between the Message Passing Layer and the system's hardware and are used
constantly. The drag on the system when two messages are sent by the broadcast
protocol is significant. Secondly, any optimizations which reduce the overhead of
processing messages during the exchange need to be used. The point to point message
passing suggested by SM(m) should be used when implementing the single-source
interactive consistency exchanges. Also, even though the use of nested signatures has a
minor effect on performance overhead, they still only need to be used by FDIR tasks.
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6. Voting
6.1. Overview
The second protocol found in the Message Passing Layer is the voting protocol.
This protocol is responsible for generating a "group consensus value," a value which is a
function of the different versions of the piece of data on different processors. Since the
processors are supposed to be operating congruently, in the absence of faults, the group
consensus value is the same as the value found on a single nonfaulty processor. Fault,
detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR) tasks use the voting protocol on a periodic basis
to generate fault symptoms and detect faults. A voting exchange is also used before
values are output externally to filter out any computational errors.
The first step in designing this protocol is to discuss the requirements of the
voting exchange and how they interface with the requirements from the interactive
consistency protocol. Once the final requirements for the system are known, the voting
algorithm can be examined and any design issues resolved. The final step is to combine
the requirements and design options into an efficient final protocol design.
6.2. Voting Requirements
The requirements for the voting protocol are a combination of guidelines
originating from the voting protocol itself and constraints placed on the architecture by
the interactive consistency protocol. The system's claim of being Byzantine resilient rests
on fulfilling the requirements discussed in Section 5.2, so the voting requirements must
not be allowed to conflict with them. Also, the goal of low-costs makes implementing
the voting protocol with the minimal interactive consistency configuration shown in
Figure 6.1 a top priority. First of all, the requirements specific to the voting protocol
must be explored. Then, each of the interactive consistency requirements must be
examined in terms of these voting requirements to show that the two lists are not in
violation of each other.
In contrast to the interactive consistency protocol, where the main emphasis is on
message passing, the most important element of the voting protocol is its choice()
function. This function is responsible for calculating a group consensus value from a set
of data gathered from all of the processors. The only requirement is that the function
calculate the same value on all nonfaulty processors. This is an important point since the
voting protocol is not required to be Byzantine resilient in that the sets of data on
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Figure 6.1 Minimal configuration fulfilling interactive consistency requirements.
nonfaulty processors do not need to be consistent. Figure 6.2 illustrates two different
choice functions calculating a group consensus value from data collected with processor
A acting as a two-faced clock and sending different values to processors B and C. Even
though the sets of data vary on the different processors, a "correct" choice() function
generates the same group consensus value on all nonfaulty processors. In Figure 6.2(a),
the choice function simply uses the value from processor A as its group consensus value.
This function does not operate correctly since with processor A being faulty, the
nonfaulty processors B and C have generated different group consensus values. In Figure
6.2(b), the choice function calculates a value which is equal to a majority of elements
within the set. This function does operate correctly since even with processor A being
faulty, the nonfaulty processors B and C both generate the same group consensus value.
Va=choice(l, 1, 1) Va= choice(l, 1, 1)
=1 =1I
1 1
1
B) C1 (m
Vb = choice(l, 1, 1) V c = choice(O, 1, 1) Vb = choice(l, 1, 1) V = choice(O, 1, 1)
= I =0 =I =I
(a) Incorrect choice function. (b) Correct choice function.
Figure 6.2 Examples of incorrect and correct choice functions.
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The hardware requirements for voting depend heavily on the structure of the
protocol. There is no lower bound on the number of processors needed in the system.
Basically, the choice() function is tailored to handle the number of processors present and
the number of faults allowed. The easiest solution is to make certain that there is always
a majority of nonfaulty processors. There are choice() functions which operate correctly
without a strict majority, but their design and implementation is complicated. The
connectivity and number of rounds requirements are determined by the type of data sets
which are desired. If the protocol wants to have consistent sets of data on each processor,
the constraints are the same as for the interactive consistency protocol (a connectivity of
f + 1 with f + 1 rounds). If there is no need for consistent data sets, the voting protocol
can be completed in one round, so long as there is a direct link between every processor.
In other words, the system must be fully connected. The final requirement of having
synchronized clocks is necessary to terminate the voting exchange when a processor
becomes faulty and fails to send a message.
The requirements placed on the proposed architecture by the interactive
consistency protocol are compared to those imposed by the voting protocol in Table 6.1.
The two protocols are not in conflict over the minimum number of processors since the
number of processors can be chosen to fulfill the interactive consistency requirement and
the voting protocol then designed around that specified number. The number of rounds
used by bach protocol have no effect on each other, so only the connectivity requirement
can come into conflict. The pros and cons of demanding consistent data sets are
discussed later in this chapter, but for now, the design is examined on the basis of the
more stringent requirement of being fully connected.
Requirements Interactive Voting
Consistency
Number of processors 2f + 1 None
Connectivity f + 1 Consistency Req.: f + 1
No Consistency Req.: Fully connected
Communication f + 1 Consistency Req.: f + 1
Rounds No Consistency Req.: 1
Synchronization Yes Yes
Table 6.1 Interactive consistency vs. voting requirements.
In the previous chapter, it was decided that the minimum configuration shown in
Figure 6.1 fits all of the hardware requirements for making a system -Byzantine resilient
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while fulfilling our desire for a low-cost implementation. The three processors meets the
majority processor bound of N > 2f + 1 and still allows flexibility in deciding on a
choice() function. The configuration also has a connectivity of two and is fully
connected, leaving the decision about which type of data sets are desired open.
6.3. Voting Algorithms and Design Issues
The voting protocol is used when the processors are expected to be acting
congruently and therefore performing the same operations on identical data. Exchanges
are performed to provide a group consensus value which is the same on all nonfaulty
processors. The algorithm directing the operation of the protocol can be split into two
sections: 1) the message passing necessary to collect data from all processors and 2) the
choice() function which uses the gathered data to provide the group consensus value.
Figure 6.3 gives a general outline of the steps necessary to calculate fault symptoms from
the viewpoint of processor A. Processors B and C send a copy of their data to processor
A, providing processor A with a set of three copies of the data. A choices function then
calculates the group consensus value. Finally, the group consensus value is used by the
FDIR task on processor A to generate a fault symptom which points to a fault on
processor C.
A's view
Va = 001 Step 1: Gather set of values from all processors.
V= {001, 001, 0111
Step 2: Compute a gup consensus value.
Va = choice(001, 001, 011)
= 001
Step 3: Generate fault syndromes.)o % /CProc.A Proc. B Proc. C
(Faulty)
Figure 6.3 Example of a voting protocol
The actual mechanics of collecting the data set and calculating the group
consensus value must now be designed. Whether or not the data sets on each of the
processors are consistent determines what operations the group consensus value can be
used for. The presence of authenticating capability adds a new dimension to the format
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of individual messages which also needs to be explored. Finally, the different types of
choice() functions must be examined to find the best fit for this architecture.
6.3.1. Consistency of Data Sets
At the end of message passing during a voting exchange, each processor has a set
of data consisting of copies from every processor in the system. The protocol must then
arrive at the same group consensus value on all nonfaulty processors even if the data sets
on the processors are not consistent. Having consistent data sets though makes the results
of the exchange much more powerful, but the added constraint also adversely affects
performance. As in many of the interactive consistency design options, this issue is a
tradeoff between more information and speed.
The relationship between the data sets found on the nonfaulty processors
determines the scope of the voting exchange. The operations which can be performed
using the data sets are severely limited if the data sets are not guaranteed to be consistent.
Inconsistent information can cause processors to act noncongruently. This is not a fault if
the information is only used locally on a single processor with no decisions made from
the results (i. e., updating a log to show if a fault has been detected). If any system-level
actions involving all of the nonfaulty processors are desired, the data sets must be
consistent to make sure that operations using the information are congruent and the
processors do not diverge.
The main problem with requiring consistent data sets is in the length of time taken
to complete the exchange of information. In order to distribute the information correctly,
the message passing in the voting protocol becomes an instantiation of the multi-source
interactive consistency From_all routine described in Chapter 5. This exchange takes
f + 1, or in our proposed system, 2, rounds to complete. On the other hand, the exchange
can be completed in only one round if the consistency requirement is lifted and the
system is fully connected. This means that the exchange is completed at least twice as
fast as the interactive consistency version.
This performance speed-up from using an one-round exchange definitely
outweighs any advantages gained through making the data sets consistent. The voting
protocol is meant to be used as a quick check for detecting faults and filtering out
computational errors. Implementing the exchange as an interactive consistency routine
negates any advantage of having a separate protocol. The best solution is to implement
an one-round exchange and then take care to perform interactive consistency exchanges
when the data sets are needed for congruent operations.
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6.3.2. Authentication of Messages
The authentication layer provides the option of signing the voting messages with
digital signatures. Whether or not the signatures are actually required depends on the
decision discussed above about providing consistent data sets. If the protocol implements
an interactive consistency algorithm to distribute the information, authentication is
needed in order to provide consistent data within the hardware constraints of the system
(2f + 1 processors with a connectivity of f + 1). If the one round exchange is used, the
issue becomes more complicated. Authentication is not needed because there is no
guarantee that the data on each processor is consistent. Since the goals of an one-round
exchange can be achieved with or without authentication, the decision must be
performance-based.
Signing messages allows a significant optimization of the choice() function.
Authentication allows faster implementation of the function for long messages since the
signatures can be used as the function's arguments instead of messages, with the added
probability of making an incorrect decision due to a forged signature being only 2 for a
n-bit signature. This decrease in the size of the elements in the data sets allows the group
consensus value to be calculated using n-bit arithmetic instead of having to process the
entire message. The problem is that a definite delay is added for the signing and
verifying of messages which could dominate performance for short messages, making
unauthenticated message passing a better choice. An option is to decide whether to sign a
message or not depending on message length, but the delay of actually making the
decision could once again outweigh any speed advantage that is gained.
6.3.3. Choice() Functions
Choice() functions in voting protocols play the important role of calculating a
group consensus value which is guaranteed to be consistent on all nonfaulty processors.
A secondary role of the exchange is to generate fault symptoms for FDIR. These
functions must operate correctly even when the data sets provided by message passing are
not consistent themselves. The many different types of choice() functions need to be
discussed and their advantages and disadvantages examined. Then, architectural and
performance issues must be taken into account before selecting the best choice() function
for the proposed system.
78
Choice() functions fall into two main categories: those which operate on the entire
set of data at the same time and those which perform a series of pairwise comparisons.
The most common method in the first category is to perform a strict majority vote and
choose the value which is contained in over half the set. Abstractly, this is done on a bit
by bit basis, but actual implementations are usually on a byte or word level. Another
possible "voting" scheme is to use a plurality choice() function where fifty percent of the
set do not need to be equal to the final value, just a sufficiently "large" number of the set
(plurality). This mechanism is most useful though for systems involving a large number
of divergent hosts and does not seem relevant for the small number of processors
involved in this project (probably, only three processors). If either one of these functions
are used, a second step is needed in the protocol to generate the fault syndromes. Each
value in the set must be compared to the group consensus value. If there is a difference,
the processor from which the value came from is assumed to be faulty. The second type
of choice() function carries out individual pairwise comparisons on the set. Each value
from another processor is compared to the host's value. If more than one of these values
are different from the host's value, the non-host values are then compared to decide
whether the host or the other processors are faulty. If the system assumes that only one
fault can occur at a time, this second step is not necessary and the host is assumed to be
faulty only if its value differs from more than one other value. If only one other value is
different from the host's copy, the processor that sent the incorrect version is assumed to
be faulty. In a large system trying to protect against more than one fault, this method is
not cost-effective. In a system with N processors, the worst case is when (N - 1) values
differ from the host. This algorithm could use up to (N -1)! comparisons to pinpoint
where the faulty processor is. This method has an advantage though over full-set voting
in that the fault syndromes can be found as the group consensus value is computed. In
systems which are only protecting against one fault, only (N - 1) comparisons are need
which could be faster than a function which uses a full-set vote and then N comparisons
to get the fault syndromes.
The fact that there are very few theoretical requirements for voting algorithms
allows the design of a protocol to allow for characteristics of the overall architecture as
well as performance issues. If the system is implemented totally in software as planned,
the comparison choice() function has definite performance advantages since it only takes
one line of code to generate the group consensus value (calculating the fault syndromes
would require more) compared to the larger amount needed for full-set voting. This
performance advantage can be made negligible to non-existent with the addition of extra
79
hardware to perform votes and comparisons in parallel. The problem is that the
specialized hardware would increase the cost of the proposed system.
6.4. Final Protocol Design
Now that the various requirements and design issues have been examined, a
voting protocol which can generate a group consensus value quickly and efficiently must
be designed. The message passing section of the protocol is carried out in one round
where each processor sends its copy of the data out on all of its links and then waits for a
message from every other processor in the system. Synchronized clocks which fulfill the
virtual synchronization and clock rate conditions described in Section 5.5 are once again
assumed to be present with the maximum message transmission delay, rmax' and skew,
6, determining the estimated length of the round. The implementation needs to include
two different exchange formats:
1) an old-fashioned exchange with unsigned messages and a full-set majority
vote of the messages as the choice() function and
2) an exchange which signs its messages and uses pairwise comparisons of
authenticated signatures as its choice() function.
The performance tradeoffs between the two options can then be examined to decide
which is the best for the proposed architecture.
Message Buffer
Message Buffer (cont.)
Message Buffer (cont.) VF
Arrival lime Invariant CRC I Variant CRC
(a) Individual buffer.
Processor A Processor B Processor C
I Message Buffer IVFI Message Bufifer IVF Message Buffer FI
(b) Voting buffer space.
Figure 6.4 Voting exchange buffers.
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Each processor uses a buffer space to process out-going and incoming messages.
This buffer space consists of a lx3 array of the same buffer used by the interactive
consistency protocol and shown in Figure 6.4(a). The Verify Flag (VF) and Invariant
CRC space are used in the authenticated voting version by its choice() function. The
slots for the arrival time and variant CRC's are holdovers from the interactive consistency
protocol and are not used by this exchange. Figure 6.4(b) shows a simplified version of
the entire buffer space. The buffer space is much smaller than the one used by the
interactive consistency protocol, since only one message from each processor needs to be
stored.
The following section contains a description of the voting exchange routine. The
algorithms outline the steps taken within each function. Various details of how the
messages are authenticated as well as how the choice() functions for both exchange
formats are carried out are included.
6.4.1. Voting One-Round Exchange
This routine is carried out in two distinct phases. First of all, data sets are
gathered containing a copy of data from every processor. Then, a choice() function is
ProcessorA'sbufferspace X:B:C 
Processor A Processor B Processor B
Processor A's buffer space X:A I X:B 4 X:C | 1 
Processor A Processor B Processor B
Processor B's buffer space X.A 4 X:B I 4 I X:C 4
Processor A Processor B Processor B
Processor C's buffer space X:A X:B X:C 
Figure 6.5 Voting message passing and buffer space at end of round.
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used to calculate the group consensus value. Figure 6.5 show the message passing during
and the buffer space after an one-round exchange using authentication with no faults. At
the end of the message passing round, each processor has a message from the other two
processors which has been authenticated.
Ad1 1 Voting Exchange Aleorithm
On processor i,
Begin round at local time, ~C(tb,,i ).-
Send messages:
Erase all buffers.
Place message in correct buffer leaving room for
If(Authenticated version)
{
header at the beginning.
Place sequence number and processor ID in trailer.
Compute and save invariant CRC.
Compute variant CRC and sign with private key.
Place signature in trailer.
}
Send message to all other processors.
Receive messages:
While (I cl (t)- (tbg,)I < (6 + rmax))
If(Receive message)
Place in correct buffer.
Vote messages:
If(Authenticated voting)
{
For( j=0; j < (Number of processors); j++)
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If (i j)
Compute and save invariant CRC.
Compute variant CRC and authenticate message
with public key.
If(Message authenticates)
{
Set verify flag (VF).
Compare messages using verify flags (VF) and invariant CRC's to
calculate the group consensus value.
If(Non-authenticated voting)
{
for(j = O0; j < message size; j++)
Compare bytes of the three messages to calculate group
consensus value.
6.4.2. Implementation Results
The design of the voting protocol cannot be completed until sections of the
protocol's functionality are implemented. This implementation is needed to answer a
number of questions whose decisions are totally dependent on performance. Two
different exchange formats have been proposed. The first option exchanges unsigned
messages and then does a full-set majority vote on the messages to generate a group
consensus value while the second choice signs its messages and uses pairwise
comparisons of authenticated signatures. Both of these designs fulfill the requirements
for the protocol, so a decision must be made based on the amount of performance
overhead needed to process messages with the two techniques. An implementation was
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completed using the C programming language and then run on a Sun workstation,
Overhead measurements were taken using timer system calls at points in the code. The
use of these calls added to the timing results, but an assumption is made that the extra
overhead is constant over the various runs.
Both of the design options process messages in two steps. First of all, the
message is prepared and then sent to every other processor in the system. Then, the set of
messages collected through the message passing is entered into a choice() function. The
message preparation for the first design option is simple since the only step required is
the addition of a header with the message's size and type. Once the set of messages is
gathered, the choice() function simply needs to vote blocks of the messages until the ends
of the messages are reached. On a machine using long word boundaries, the fastest way
to implement this routine is to examine the messages in blocks of 32 bits. Implementing
the second design option is more complicated. In addition to adding the header to the
beginning of the message, a digital signature has to be generated and appended to the end
of the message. Once the messages are gathered, the choice() function authenticates the
messages from the other processors and compares the invariant CRC's of the verified
signatures to the invariant CRC of its own message.
Determining the performance overhead introduced by each design choice involves
examining the amount of time spent processing messages in functions not duplicated by
the other option. First of all, the additional time needed by the option using
authentication to sign its message needs to be measured. Then, the time spent in the
system calls used to send and then receive messages has to be measured since each
options is exchanging different length messages (the option using authentication has
longer messages due to the digital signatures). Finally, the time spent actually processing
the messages within the choice() function needs to be measured.
Two important results can be seen from the performance overhead comparison of
the two design options shown in Figure 6.6. First of all, two different overheads are
plotted for each option: one line accounting for all of the performance overheads and
another line showing the performance overhead without the time taken up by the I/O
system calls. Over 800 microseconds are needed to send the two messages to the other
processors, approximately 400 microseconds/message. The receiving system call used
closer to 100 microseconds for each message, which is less than for sending messages,
but still a significant amount. Secondly, there is an obvious difference in the times
needed by the two options. The extra computations needed to generate and then sign
CRC's means that the time taken to just append the signature to the message is longer
than the time required to vote the messages after they are received. When the overhead
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of authenticating the signatures of messages from other processors is included, this
difference becomes even more pronounced. Therefore, the voting protocol needs to be
implemented without digital signatures and using a full-set majority vote choice()
function. Even with all of the optimization made to reduce the overhead introduced by
authentication, the process is still slower than the voting of a message.
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Figure 6.6 Comparison of voting performance overheads.
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7. Synchronization
7.1. Overview
The Synchronization Layer is responsible for providing synchronized virtual
clocks to the Message Passing and Application Layers. The synchronization protocol
within this layer bounds the drift between the virtual clocks on different processors so
that their ideas of real time are always within a known skew of each other. These virtual
clocks are implemented on top of the hardware clocks in a way which makes
synchronization invisible to the user. The synchronization protocol for this system is the
last protocol to be designed since certain facets of the design are constrained by decisions
made in implementing the rest of the architecture. The amount of synchronization
possible is dependent on the specific protocol and parameters of both the protocol and
system.
This chapter first gives a general outline of synchronization protocols and then
discusses the various design issues involved in implementing a protocol with this
architecture. The final choice of protocol is then described in detail with a discussion on
how to bound important protocol parameters.
7.2. Synchronization Protocols
Many clock synchronization protocols have been suggested over the years for
dealing with different problems or optimized for specific cases. At first, evaluating the
different routines was very difficult Subtle variations in the model and assumptions used
to define each protocol complicated any attempt at making comparisons. Adding to the
confusion, clock synchronization protocols were split into three different classes:
interactive convergence protocols, interactive consistency protocols, and diffusion/flood
protocols. This changed in 1987, when Fred Schneider presented a general paradigm
from which all of the above categories of clock synchronization protocols could be
derived [Sch87].
72.1. Schneider's Clock Synchronization Paradigm
Schneider's generalized paradigm placed the study and development of clock
synchronization protocols on a totally new footing. The protocols can now be compared
using his model of the problem and the advantages and disadvantages of each protocol
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isolated. The paradigm also pinpoints three subproblems which define each and every
clock synchronization protocol. Protocols can be custom-designed based on the needs
and characteristics of each system. Most importantly, so long as the new protocol
adheres to the model and assumptions underlying the paradigm, proving that it is correct
is greatly simplified.
Schneider defines a system as a collection of processors with virtual clocks. Each
virtual clock is implemented using a hardware clock and a reliable time source (RTS)
which calculates an adjustment value for the hardware clock using a convergence
function. A formal definition of each of these components is found in Appendix B where
the correctness of the protocol is proved. In general, hardware clocks are viewed as
counters which start from some fixed initial value and monotonically increase by
increments of one with a rate which must be within a fixed constant, known as the
hardware drift rate of the clock, of the rate at which real time passes. Virtual clocks are
implemented on top of these hardware clocks so that they also are monotonically
increasing with a fixed virtual drift rate. The RTS is an abstraction which is responsible
for generating an event at a specific real time which in turn causes the processors to
resynchronize their clocks. The RTS then provides an adjustment value to each processor
for use in implementing its virtual clock. If the protocol works correctly, the virtual
clocks on all nonfaulty processors are always within a known skew of each other.
Processors read the vitual do cks of the other processors and
clculte new adjustment with CFO.
I rIu t I]
. . A I 4 Proc, detcs I
Proc. A-
Proc. B -
PRoc. C-
_ _
I
---
Itm
Round i
Figure 7.1 An abstract picture of clock synchronization.
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Schneider provides a clock synchronization paradigm which outlines the steps
involved in each synchronization interval. Figure 7.1 gives an abstract picture of these
events. The RTS generates a synchronization event at a real time, tRTS. This event is
only an abstraction of when the synchronization interval would begin on the processors if
their virtual clocks were completely synchronized to real time. Instead, each processor
then "detects" the synchronization event when their virtual clock reaches its idea of tRrs .
All of the nonfaulty processors must detect the synchronization event within a known
skew of each other, but it is entirely possible for a fast processor, like processor B in
Figure 7.1, to detect the synchronization event before the RTS has even generated it.
Each processor then reads the virtual clocks of the other processors and calculates a new
adjustment for its virtual clock using a convergence function (CF). The synchronization
interval ends on each processor when it adds the new adjustment to its hardware clock.
Restating the paradigm more precisely, let i be the number of the current round, adjp be
the adjustment added to the hardware clock for each processor, p, Cp be the virtual clock
of each processor, p, cp be the hardware clock of processor, p, and t be the real time at
which each processor p detects the event [Sch87]:
i:= 1;
adj ° := 0; adj~ := 0;
do forever
detect event generated at time t+;
ti~= real time now;
adjp+ := CF(pC (t+) c (tP)) - tP+
od
The above paradigm leaves three important areas unspecified. Different
implementations of the "detect event generated at time t
~
" determine when and how
often the system resynchronizes. The method that a processor uses to read the virtual
clocks on other processors must be chosen to mesh with other characteristics and
requirements of the system. Finally, the convergence function used in many way decides
the accuracy and precision of the overall protocol. The solutions for these three
subproblems totally define a clock synchronization protocol.
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7.3. Synchronization Design Issues
Decisions made in the rest of the design constrain and shape the possible
synchronization protocols for this architecture. The use of authentication to provide
interactive consistency with only 2f + 1 processors and f + 1 communication links,
wheref is the number of Byzantine faults which the system can tolerate, places
restrictions on the design of the clock synchronization protocol. The trade-off which
allows fewer processors and links in the system requires that all single-source information
passing between the processors (i. e., a processor's virtual clock value) be signed and then
verified using unforgeable signatures. This immediately rules out protocols using analog
information, such as the phased-locked clocks proposed in [KSB85] where knowledge of
all other clock pulses is necessary. Only protocols which use digital message passing
techniques can be integrated into an authentication-based system. The algorithm which is
used for interactive consistency plays a major role since the protocol needs to exchange
individual clocks. In effect, the synchronization protocol needs to be built on top of this
algorithm. These factors must be kept in mind when examining the different
implementation options for Schneider's subproblems.
7.3.1. Detecting an event generated at time, ts
There are two basic ways of generating and detecting a synchronization event
based on increments of real time [Sch87]. The first option depends on the assumption
that the virtual clocks are already synchronized to within a known skew. For some
predefined value, R, each processor waits until its virtual clock reads a multiple of R
before starting the next synchronization interval. Since the clocks are synchronized, the
slowest nonfaulty processor must decide to resynchronize within a known skew of the
fastest nonfaulty processor's action. This method is used for implementations which
already have access to the information needed to resynchronize their clocks. A good
example of this is the technique used by the phase-locked clocks found in [KSB85] where
each clock can monitor the clock pulses of the other clocks in the system and adjust
themselves accordingly. A second way to generate the synchronization event is to have
each processor broadcast a message when its virtual clock reads a predefined value and to
resynchronize when such a message is received from a correct processor. This method is
used in all of the protocols which employ Byzantine Agreement (BA) message passing to
synchronize [HSSD83, LL83, LM84, ST85].
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Babaoglu and Drummond suggest another way to schedule synchronization events
in [BD87]. They wanted to use information collected from ordinary communications to
synchronize clocks. Instead of waiting for a predefined amount of time and then
resynchronizing, their protocol uses a communication step called a Full Message
Exchange (FME) as its event. A FME requires that each processor sends a message to all
other processors. The arrival times of the messages are recorded and a new clock is
started using the average of these times. The only time a specific synchronization round
is needed is when a predefined period passes without a FME. This is an excellent
solution to the overhead problem commonly associated with synchronization protocols.
When the system is busy, synchronization data is "piggybacked" on messages carrying
other information. The only synchronization overhead involved is the time necessary to
adjust the virtual clocks. The only time that a specific slot has to be allocated to
synchronization is when the system is idle and the extra overhead does not matter. The
problem with the protocol as specified in BD87] is that since it only uses information
from one round of messages, it is not Byzantine resilient. The protocol therefore needs to
be modified to use f + 1 rounds of information before it can provide the desired fault-
tolerance.
7.3.2. Reading virtual clocks on other processors
Since processors only have access to their own local clock time, they need a
mechanism for reading the virtual clocks on all other processors so the convergence
function can compute a new adjustment. The architectural constraint imposed by the use
of authentication plus hardware limitations prevents a processor from reading all of the
other virtual clocks simultaneously. This means that the convergence function cannot
directly use values read from other processors as its clock arguments. Instead, each
processor must approximate a virtual clock on another processor by reading the
difference between the two clocks and adding it to its own [LM84]. Each processor
therefore needs to keep a current table of the differences between its own virtual clock
and the virtual clocks on other processors.
The way these differences are obtained is an integral part of each clock
synchronization routine. The most basic techniques for finding the differences using
Byzantine Agreement (BA) message passing rounds were described by Lamport and
Melliar-Smith in [LM84]. The first two algorithms in the paper do not place any
requirements on how clocks are read and thus 3f + 1 processors are needed to provide
synchronization. The third protocol though is an extension of the SM(m) algorithm found
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in [LSP82] and discussed in Chapter 6. In general terms, the protocol sends virtual
clocks which have been signed instead of messages. The algorithm accounts for the time
that a message takes to be signed, sent, received, and verified at its destination by adding
the product of a message transmission delay constant, , and the number of times the
message has been relayed to the clock. Since authentication is used, a faulty processor
cannot corrupt the value of a clock and thus set the clock forward; it can only delay
sending the value and in effect, set the clock back. Figure 7.2 illustrates how a faulty
processor can set a clock back by holding onto a message. The actual message
transmission delay between two processors i and j (not counting the delay added by the
fault) is represented by the variable, yij. In the faulty example, processor C has no way
of telling that the relay message from processor A has been delayed by the faulty
processor B and would therefore use (yc + delay) as one of the approximations for
processor A's virtual clock. Similar clock reading schemes are used by the protocols of
[HSSD83], [LL83], and [ST85], except the number of messages needed is reduced by
having each processor periodically broadcast its virtual clock, instead of waiting for a
request [Sch87].
Proc.
Proc.
Proc.
.~........ Correct Synhnocication in t £
_Coirect~ Synch on icion D. |Synchnication IntervalInterval with B faulty
Figure 7.2 Synchronization fault with authentication.
7.3.3. Convergence Functions
A convergence function (CF) uses the virtual clocks of all processors in the
system to calculate a new adjustment to a specific processor's hardware clock. Such a
function does not guarantee that the virtual clocks on different processors will have the
same value. The only requirement is that the new virtual clocks provided by the
convergence function are closer together than the old virtual clocks. All convergence
functions must have two basic properties [Sch87]. The first requirement is that the
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convergence function (CF) on processorp be monotonically non-decreasing in its last N
arguments such that:
If (Vi: 1 i N:xi < y,), then CF(p,x,,...,xN) CF(p,yl ,...,y,).
This property is needed to make sure that the values from the RTS do not decrease. The
convergence function (CF) must also be translation invariant so that values on different
processors and at different times can be compared. Translation invariance means that:
CF(p,x, V ... IXN + ) = CF(P,x,,...,x--,XN)+ V.
Mahaney and Schneider provided a means of comparing the different convergence
functions in [MS85] when they defined their functions in terms of precision and accuracy.
Table 7.1 is directly reproduced from [Sch87] (with small changes to keep variables
within this thesis consistent) and compares the different convergence functions found in
previous literature using these measures. The fault-tolerance degree,f (k in [Sch87]),
specifies the number of significantly differing clock values resulting from faulty
Table 7.1 Comparison of convergence functions [Sch87].
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1 Assumes digital signatures.
processors that the function can use and still generate valid results. Values within a set
skew, 6, of each other are considered to be correct. The error involved in reading the
clocks is quantified as e. The precision of a function, (§, e), determines how close the
values obtained by two different computations of a convergence function with varying
arguments will be, so long as at least N - f arguments are correct. The accuracy, a(o),
specifies how close a final value obtained with N - f correct values is to the "correct"
real time.
The first four functions in Table 7.1 come from some of the earliest work in
Byzantine resilient synchronization protocols. Most of the derivations of precision and
accuracy limits for these function can be found in [MS85]. CFE is presented and
analyzed in [LM85] with their interactive convergence algorithm and is the average of all
clocks which are no more than a skew from a processor's own clock. CFFCA is an
extension of CFEA suggested in [MS85] where all clocks which are within a skew of
N - f other clocks are averaged.
The next two convergence functions come from [DLPSW83] and are described as
fault-tolerant, because thef highest andf lowest values are discarded. The worst case
fault scenario in synchronization is thatf of the clock values have been corrupted by
faulty processors to either all be slow or all be fast. It is possible for intermediate values
to be corrupted, but they would not cause the convergence function to return an invalid
result. CFMd takes the midpoint of the range spanned by the function's remaining
arguments while CFA,, averages the leftover arguments. These first four functions do not
place any requirements on how messages are sent and therefore have a high fault-
tolerance degree in the table. If authentication is used, this fault-tolerance degree would
fall to (N -.
The last four convergence functions in Table 7.1 are based on different interactive
consistency algorithms. CFCCA uses a cheaper message passing protocol known as
Crusader's Agreement to disseminate its clock and thus provides a lesser degree of fault
tolerance [MS85]. The final two functions, CFSE1 and CFwSE2, use an optimized
form of Byzantine Agreement, known as Fireworks Agreement, where all correct
processors agree on the value of a single correct clock by causing all to terminate the
protocol at approximately the same (real) time. Both Crusader's and Fireworks
Agreement are cheaper protocols in terms of performance, but they also provide a weaker
form of fault tolerance than Byzantine resilience. CFByz first appears in the CSM(m)
algorithm found in [LM84] and uses authentication and the fact that clocks can only be
set back by faulty processors to select its value. Since the use of digital signatures
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prevent faulty processors from setting a clock forward, CFByz chooses the (f + 1)'
greatest clock. Note from Table 7.1 that the precision of this function is independent of
the skew between the clocks. Instead, the precision is a function of A, the maximum
clock reading error between two clocks. This maximum clock reading error accounts for
both the error introduced by the mechanics of reading another processor's virtual clock
and drift between processors.
7.4. Final Protocol Design
The Synchronization Layer is placed between the Application and Message
Passing Layer and the system's unsynchronized hardware clocks. The layer was the last
part of the architecture to be designed, because it depended heavily on the structure of the
interactive consistency protocol. Since a processor's virtual clock is single-source
information, the method used to disseminate its value between the other processors needs
to be Byzantine resilient. The best and certainly the easiest solution to this problem is to
extend the interactive consistency mechanism to handle synchronization.
The clock synchronization protocol used in this proposed design is derived from
ideas in [LM84] and [BD87]. Chapter 6 describes the implementation of a From_all
message passing routine which distributes single-source information from every
processor in the system using the SM(m) algorithm in [LSP82]. Lamport and Melliar-
Smith show how to implement a clock synchronization protocol using the above
algorithm in [LM84]. The only major difference between their protocol and the our
proposed version comes from the observation that a From_all provides a Byzantine
resilient form of the FME suggested by Babaoglu and Drummond in [BD87]. The final
protocol uses information gleaned from a regular From all to perform synchronization,
only employing a specialized synchronization exchange called From_all_sync when a
predefined amount of time passes without a From_all.
In the next section, a more in-depth description is provided to show that the
protocol follows the steps required by Schneider's clock synchronization paradigm.
Then, the extension needed for the Initial Synchronization (ISYNC) period required to
synchronize the clocks to within the required initial skew when the system is first started
is discussed. Finally, a methodology for calculating the precision of the protocol is
explained.
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7.4.1. Description of the Clock Synchronization Protocol
Schneider's paradigm states that clock synchronization protocols are completely
defined by their solutions to the three subproblems described earlier in this chapter. Our
protocol implements two different types of synchronizations: "no-cost" synchronization,
where timing information is piggybacked on other messages, and "required
synchronization," where a special message passing exchange is performed just to
distribute synchronization data. The timing of synchronization events and the type of
synchronization used is highly variable, depending on the tasks being run by the system.
Both types of synchronization use the Byzantine Agreement technique described by
[LM84] in their CSM(m) algorithm to read the virtual clocks on other processors.
Finally, since a Byzantine Agreement protocol with authentication is utilized, CFByz is
used to calculate the new time adjustments. Outlining the solutions to each one of these
subproblems provides an in-depth description of the whole protocol.
Before the protocol can be discussed in detail, a description of the task
environment is required. Currently, only two tasks are assumed to be running: a
generalized application task and when necessary, a required synchronization task. The
different tasks are periodically allocated frames, or intervals of (virtual) time, in which
the task is assumed to complete all of its operations. The application task is given R
virtual seconds to finish, while the required synchronization task receives S virtual
seconds. At the end of this (virtual) time, an interrupt goes off sending the processor to
the next task. Within each frame, the task operates nondeterministically, in that it
completes each instruction in order but not at predetermined virtual times. This means
that tasks on different processors may execute at different rates. Figure 7.4 illustrates
how the same task frame running on three different processors might look in terms of the
Processor A
Processor B
Processor C
irtual time)
irtual time)
irtl.nl timp.)%'c \' Id a l . l l;
6 (Real time)
Figure 7.3 Task frame behavior.
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virtual time on each processor. The frame start and end occurs at the same virtual time
due to an interrupt going off, but since execution rates on the processors vary, the same
operation within the task happens at different virtual times. The only requirement is that
the operations be performed on each processor within a known skew of (real) time.
The time at which a synchronization event is generated is determined by the
placement of Fromall exchanges within the task. At the beginning of each application
frame, an interrupt based on the processor's virtual clock is set to jump to a required
synchronization frame in which a special synchronization From_all_sync exchange is
performed. If the application does a From_all exchange during its frame, it adjusts its
virtual clock using no-cost synchronization. Since synchronization has already been
done, the required synchronization frame is not necessary and the interrupt is reset to
jump to an application frame. Figure 7.4 illustrates how the tasks might be scheduled on
a processor. During the first two application frames, a From_all exchange is carried out,
so the next frame is also an application frame. In the third application frame, no
From_all exchanges are performed, so a required synchronization frame with a
Fromallsync exchange follows. This design should cause a significant reduction in
overhead, since specific frames are not needed for synchronization when the machine is
busy. The only time synchronization engenders a large overhead is when the system is
idle and multi-source interactive consistency exchanges (another cause of overhead
problems) are not present.
Frnm allexchane Frnm all .vnr exchane.
'(t) (Virtual time)
Application irames
Required Synchronization Rames
Figure 7.4 Application and required synchronization frames.
Once the processors have decided to synchronize, they must read the virtual
clocks on all of the other processors. These virtual clocks are approximated using the
processor's own virtual clock and the time difference between the two clocks. The time
differences are collected during either a From_all exchange if no-cost synchronization is
being performed or a From_all_sync if required synchronization is needed. The only
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difference between the two routines is that no actual message is sent during a
From_allsync exchange, just the header and trailer of a zero-byte message. Each
message is given a timestamp using the virtual clock of the sender. The arrival time of
each message is also recorded according to the receiving processor's virtual clock. An
estimation of the time difference between two processors is calculated using the
following equation:
p, [q] = T - p (tar,,iva) - ry, (7.1)
where 'rp[q] is an estimation of the difference between the virtual clocks on processors p
and q as seen by processor p, T is the timestamp in the message from processor q,
p (tarri,) is the message's arrival time according to processor p's virtual clock, r is the
number of the current round within the exchange (1 or 2), and y is the message
transmission delay constant. The message transmission delay constant, y, is an
estimation of amount of time needed to sign, send, receive, and authenticate a message.
Figure 7.5 shows the different message delays and the message delay error. The (virtual)
time needed to process a message is bounded by the constants, Fmm, and Fmax. The
message delay error, Ar, is the difference between the minimum and maximum delays,
rm,, and rax,,, while y is the average of IFm and Fmax. The error of introduced by
using y to estimate the actual message delay is therefore bounded by ±At2.
Start sending message Ar
/
~Fmm
Fml
~
4 rmaI
c(t) (Virtual time)
rIl,' : Minimum tansmission delay
y : Message transmission delay constant
Fmax : Maximum tansmission delay.
AF : Message delay eror
Figure 7.5 Message transmission delays and message delay error.
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Once estimations of the difference between all of the virtual clocks have been
collected, convergence functions (CF) are used to calculate a new time adjustment for a
processor's hardware clock. In this implementation, the convergence function, CF.yz, is
used within the interactive consistency exchange. During the message passing, each
processor gathers f + 2 estimations of the difference between its own virtual clock and
every other processor's virtual clock, with the difference between a processor's clock and
itself being set to zero. CF z, is applied to these arguments and returns the (f + 1)'h
greatest difference. Once an estimation of every processor's virtual clock has been made,
the processor has a set of N virtual times, one from each processor in the system which
are used to calculate the new time adjustment. A convergence function such as CFF4 can
then be used to generate this time adjustment.
7.42. Initial Synchronization (ISYNC)
The problem of initially synchronizing the clocks when the system first starts is
much more complicated than the issue of resynchronizing clocks which are already
within a skew of each other. The designer can assume that all processor will start within
a given interval of time, ,u, such that
ci'(0) < # for i = 1... N, (7.2)
but this interval must be a large amount of time. Much more care is needed to guarantee
that messages sent by another processor during previous round do not overlap into a new
round. The algorithm which is used during the system's Initial Synchronization (ISYNC)
period is an extension of one found in [LL83].
Lundelius' and Lynch's ISYNC algorithm adds an additional step to each message
passing round. ISYNC rounds still consist of (virtual) time intervals when messages are
sent and then each processor waits long enough to guarantee that all of the messages from
other processors have arrived. The difference is that each processor then waits for a
second interval to be certain that new messages are not received by other processors in
their first waiting period and then sends a READY message to all other processors
indicating that it is prepared to begin the next round. However, if a processor receives
f + 1 READY messages before it completes its second waiting interval, it ends the
interval early and sends its own READY message. The extra message passing guarantees
that no clock values from the previous round will be received after a processor has begun
a new round. The number of ISYNC rounds required to bring the system's virtual clocks
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within a desired skew is determined by the precision of the convergence function, CF.yz,
and the synchronization protocol. This process is discussed in the next section.
7.4.3. Determining the Precision of the Synchronization Protocol
Determining the precision of a clock synchronization protocol involves finding
the maximum amount of skew which can occur between the virtual clocks in the system,
assuming that the clocks were synchronized before the last resynchronization period.
This maximum skew places a lower bound on the desired skew parameter, 8, around
which the clock synchronization protocol is designed. The process of deriving this
precision must take into account characteristics of both the protocol itself and the system
(and therefore hardware) on which it is running. An assumption is made that the protocol
operates "correctly." A proof of the correctness of the proposed protocol, based on a
proof provided in [Sch87], is found in Appendix B. Actually finding a realistic value for
the lower bound of 8, or 8m, is a separate process.
The worst skew between virtual clocks happens just before a resynchronization
interval. Therefore, deriving the precision of the clock synchronization protocol is done
in two steps. First of all, the worst-case precision of the virtual clocks immediately after
a resynchronization must be found. Then, the maximum amount of drift which can occur
before the next resynchronization interval needs to be added. The maximum amount of
skew found just before the resynchronization interval is the sum of two values such that
(6 E) + = m <8 , (7.3)
where r(8, e) is the precision of the convergence function (and therefore the virtual
clocks immediately after the protocol makes its time adjustment) and is the maximum
amount of drift in (real) time between resynchronizations.
Before any of these parameters can be derived, the different time frames of
reference need to be explained more thoroughly. These different frames of reference
complicate the concept of clock synchronization. Each frame of reference is layered on
top of one another, and they tend to drift apart when left alone. The sole purpose of clock
synchronization is to continuously drag these frames back together.
There are four frames of reference which must be taken into account when
analyzing this protocol. The first three are standard to all clock synchronization
protocols. First of all, a Newtonian, or real time (t), frame is assumed. Real time is not
directly observable, but is more of an abstraction around which the other frames are built.
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The second time frame, known as hardware time (c(t)), is linked to real time by the
hardware drift rate condition which says that:
0<-p< C(t) - C(t) +p, for 0 < t, (7.4)
where ic is the hardware clock tick width and p is the hardware drift rate. For most
hardware clocks based on crystal oscillators at constant temperature, the hardware drift
rate, p, is around 10-4 [Se4ec]. The third time frame, known as virtual time ((t)), is
layered on top of hardware time. Virtual time drifts from hardware time due to error in
reading the counter which is implementing the virtual clock. At any one time, the virtual
clock can be up to half of one least significant bit (lsb) of the virtual clock away from the
hardware clock.
Figure 7.6 illustrates how these three time references would look on a [sesecl
coordinate system. Real time does not drift on this coordinate system so it is represented
by the line which intersects the (1 sec, 1 sec) point. Hardware time can drift from real
time at p [Se/ec] which is represented by the solid l i nesbg away from the real
time line. At 1 second, the only guarantee is that hardware time is within ±p seconds of
real time. Added to this uncertainty is the virtual time drift which provides the dashed
lines bordering the hardware time bounds. At 1 sec elapsed (real) time, virtual time is
guaranteed to be within + 2lsb seconds of hardware time. This combined drift continues
to widen as real time passes, unless a clock synchronization protocol is used to bring the
virtual clocks closer together again.
Hardware, vi
time (sec)
ke, t
ware time bound
:lock drift
1 sec Real time (sec)
Figure 7.6 Comparing the different time references.
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The last time frame of reference is required due to the way tasks run within their
frames. Task operations are not deterministically scheduled to occur at specific virtual
times. The task simply executes each instruction in order as the task reaches that point in
its routine. Task execution rates may vary on the different processors due to such
intangibles as the processor's temperature, error state, age, or other characteristics,
causing each processor to reach the same event at different virtual times. Since no-cost
synchronization is carried out in conjunction with an application task performing a
From_all exchange, the virtual time at which synchronization is done can therefore be
different on each processor. This is a significant change from previous designs where
synchronization intervals were scheduled to begin at the same virtual times on each
processor [HSSD83, KSB85, LL83, LM84, PB86, Sch87]. Figure 7.7 illustrates the
difference that this makes in message passing. In Figure 7.7(a), processors i and j send
messages when their virtual clocks reach their idea of the real time, t,,d. These events
occur on the two processors at the same virtual time (relative to the specific processor)
but at the different real times, t,,.di and t,,.di . When processor j receives the message at
virtual time, , (t,i,), the (virtual) time difference between when processor i sends the
message and when processor j receives it is simply the transmission delay, yij. In Figure
7.7(b), processors i and j send their messages when their virtual clocks reach their idea of
different real times (t8 ,,di and t,,i.dj, respectively). These events not only happen at
different real times, but at different virtual times on each processor. This task execution
drift adds a term, ij, to the (virtual) time difference between when processor i sends the
message and when processor j receives it. The task execution frame of reference has one
major difference between it and the hardware and virtual time frames of reference. The
task execution drift is reduced to zero every time a new frame is begun, because each
frame boundary is deterministically scheduled using an interrupt. Therefore, the task is
begun at the same virtual time on each processor. In order to quantify this drift, the
designer needs to find a maximum bound, 4, for the number of instructions/application
frame (assuming that R > S) by which the tasks can differ. The time length of the frame
(R seconds for an application frame) can be used to translate this drift into the virtual time
frame of reference.
Once these time frames of reference are understood, the process of determining
the precision of the clock synchronization protocol can begin. The first step is to
determine the skew between the virtual clocks immediately after a resynchronization by
quantifying the precision of the convergence function. Our proposed protocol uses CFy z
which guarantees that virtual clocks are within 2A, twice the maximum clock reading
error, of each other. Therefore, the important parameter which must be quantified is A.
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(a) Message passing with virtual time-based synchronizations
(i(ts,j i) = j(t,,dj) and t.d, * t,,ad.j).
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(b) Message passing with task execution-based synchronizations
( i(t.,,i) * j(tdj) and t,,,i *: t.,,j).
Figure 7.7. Virtual time- vs. task execution-based synchronizations.
The maximum clock reading error, A, is made up of the maximum amount of
message delay error which is possible plus the maximum amount of task execution drift
which can occur. Message delay error, Ar, is shown in Figure 7.5. The error is
composed of the variable time which is needed by both the sender and the receiver to
process a message. In order to get a realistic value for this parameter, the designer must
determine the minimums and maximums for the following times:
1) the time needed to sign the message, to include generating the CRC and
multiplying the CRC by the private key (signing time),
2) the time needed to send the message (sending time),
3) the time needed for the message to travel to the receiving processor
(propagation delay),
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4) the time needed for the receiver to realize that a message has arrived and to
collect the message (receiving time), and
5) the time needed to authenticate the message, to include generating the CRC
and multiplying the CRC by the public key (authentication time).
The estimated message delay is guaranteed to be within + A/ 2 of the actual delay. In
previous designs, the maximum message delay error would be the same as the maximum
clock reading error. In our proposed protocol though, task execution drift must be
accounted for. In Figure 7.5, the different times are in terms of one processor's virtual
clock. In order to guarantee that every processor has reached its own virtual time when it
sends messages, the message delay error must be corrected for worst-cast task execution
drift. This worst-case drift occurs at the end of an application frame. At this point, the
task execution drift is bounded by R%/ virtual seconds, where R is the length of the
application frame in virtual seconds, m is the maximum number of instructions in the
application frame, and D is the bound on execution drift in terms of instructions per
frame. Therefore, the worst-case precision of the protocol after a resynchronization is
max, (3,E)= )2(AFr+ R/m). (7.5)
Once a value for rmax (6, e) is known, finding the precision of the clock
synchronization protocol involves correcting for the maximum amount of drift which can
occur between the clocks before the next resynchronization. The worst-case scenario for
the time between resynchronizations is when an application synchronizes its virtual
clocks at the very beginning of one application frame and then does not perform a
From_all exchange during the next application frame. This means that the clocks are not
resynchronized until the end of the following required synchronization frame, an interval
bounded by 2R + S virtual seconds. The virtual clocks can therefore drift a total of
,=2*p (2R+S)+(2lsb)+S/m, (7.6)
with the SDm term added for task execution drift since the resynchronization occurs at
the end of the required synchronization frame. Using Equation (7.3), the lower bound for
achievable skew is thus
in 2Ar + 2 p(2R + S) + (Y2 1sb)+ (2R + S))m. (7.7)
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8. Conclusions and Recommendations
8.1. Overview
This architecture study provides the groundwork for implementing a new
generation of Byzantine resilient processors using authentication. A layering scheme is
proposed which can be placed between the user and hardware. These layers are made up
of protocols which provide the basic building blocks of the architecture. The final design
proposed for each protocol is described in the following section. The final section
discusses topics which still need to be researched before the system can be fully
implemented.
8.2. A Byzantine-Resilient Architecture using Authentication
The proposed architecture is built around the use of digital signatures to
authenticate the origin and contents of messages. The use of authentication allows a
significant reduction in the theoretical requirements necessary for providing Byzantine
resilience, or the ability to continue correct operation in the presence of arbitrary or even
malicious faults. This decrease in the requirements led to the goal described in Chapter 2
of providing a system which combines the stringent standards embodied by Byzantine
resilience with the lower costs necessary to make the system viable for more markets than
previous Byzantine resilient processors.
An investigation of the basic building blocks required by the proposed
architecture is found in Chapter 3. The result of this investigation is the layering scheme
shown in Figure 8.1. These layers are designed to be placed between the user and the
system's hardware, keeping the mechanics involved in providing Byzantine resilience
invisible to the user. Each layer is composed of one or two protocols responsible for
providing services for the layer. The design of these protocols is described in Chapters 4,
5, 6, and 7 and serves to specify the proposed architecture.
Chapter 4 covers the design of the authentication protocol, the fundamental
building block upon which the rest of the architecture rests. First of all, an in-depth study
of the theoretical and practical requirements which must be fulfilled by the protocol is
done in Section 4.2. The two different options for authentication protocols, private-key
and public-key authentication, are described with the reasoning behind choosing public-
key protocol for this proposed architecture in Section 4.3. The design of the protocol is
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Figure 8.1 Layering scheme for the proposed architecture.
then broken into the three functions required by public-key authentication: the encoding,
signing, and authenticating functions. The encoding function generates a n-bit
representation of the message for the signing function to sign with a private key to get the
digital signature. The authenticating function uses this signature and a public key related
to the private key to provide a result which can be compared with an encoded n-bit
representation of the received message to authenticate the message. A method for
generating private and public key pairs using modular inverses is described in Section
4.4. This is followed in Section 4.5 by a discussion of the issues involved in using Cyclic
Redundancy Codes (CRC's) to implement the encoding function. The final design of the
authentication protocol proposes employing a 32-bit CRC generator polynomial to
encode the message with 32-bit modular inverse keys used by the signing and
authenticating functions. A 32-bit CRC does not provide the reliability imparted by the
64-bit generator polynomial derived in Section 4.5.1, but its implementation requires less
performance overhead to authenticate messages. A corollary to the decision to use the
faster 32-bit CRC is the suggestion that the functions in the authentication protocols be
optimized as much as possible by implementing them using the assembly code of the
specific processors upon which the system is running.
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The interactive consistency protocol found in the Message Passing Layer is
described in Chapter 5. This protocol is responsible for distributing data between
processors in a way which satisfies the Byzantine Agreement conditions found in Section
3.3. The protocol provides the Byzantine resilience for the entire system as it prevents
faulty processors from influencing the data on nonfaulty processors. Section 5.2
investigates the requirements placed on a system using authentication which desires to
provide interactive consistency. This discussion is followed by a description of
Byzantine Agreement algorithms in Section 5.3 which concentrates on the SM(m)
algorithm from [LSP82] and the improvements suggested in [DS83]. The following
section examines the various design issues involved in implementing this algorithm
which are then incorporated into the final protocol design provided in Section 5.5.
Section 5.5 describes the structure of four routines which make up the design of the
protocol: three single-source exchanges (From_a, From_b, and From_c) and a multi-
source exchange (From_all) which distributes data from all of the processors. An
implementation of parts of the protocol in Section 5.5.2 resulted in a final design proposal
for the interactive consistency protocol which employs the point to point message passing
of the SM(m) algorithm without the algorithm's use of nested signatures. An additional
result of this study is the realization of the amount of performance overhead taken by the
I/O system calls used to send and receive messages and the need for optimization of these
routines in any final implementation.
The second protocol of the Message Passing Layer is the voting protocol
discussed in Chapter 6. This protocol is responsible for generating a group consensus
value which is guaranteed to be the same on all nonfaulty processors. The first step in
designing the protocol, found in Section 6.2, involved examining the requirements of the
voting protocol and making certain that they did not conflict with the requirements set by
the interactive consistency protocol. Section 6.3 describes the basic voting algorithm
with its message passing interval and choice() function, followed by an investigation of
the design issues involved in implementing these sections of the protocol. Section 6.4
describes the structure of a routine which implements the voting protocol. An
implementation of parts of this routine in Section 6.4.2 resulted in a final design proposal
for the voting protocol which exchanges unsigned messages and then uses a full-set
majority vote choice() function to calculate the group consensus value.
The synchronization protocol discussed in Chapter 7 implements the final layer of
the architecture, the Synchronization Layer. This protocol provides the synchronized
clocks which are needed to guarantee that tasks will terminate even when a processor
becomes faulty and stops sending messages. In Section 7.2, the clock synchronization
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problem is split into three subproblems using a paradigm found in [Sch87]. The solutions
to these subproblems completely specify a clock synchronization protocol. The design
issues involved in implementing the subproblems are discussed in Section 7.3. Section
7.4 describes a method for synchronizing clocks which minimizes the amount of
performance overhead needed by the protocol. Two forms of synchronization are
proposed: no-cost synchronization and required synchronization. The no-cost
synchronization is performed using information which has been "piggybacked" on the
messages of a normal multi-source interactive consistency Fromall exchange. Required
synchronization is only needed when an application frame finishes without performing a
From_all exchange. When this occurs, a required synchronization frame is allocated for
a Fromall_sync exchange. Once approximations of the virtual clocks on other
processors are gathered, a time adjustment is calculated using a technique suggested by
the CSM(m) algorithm from [LM84]. The final part of the chapter, Section 7.4.3,
describes the how to determine the precision of the synchronization protocol, taking into
account characteristics of both the protocol itself and the system (and therefore hardware)
on which it is running. This process must account the different types of drift present in
the system, including task execution drift which is a problem not present in previous
clock synchronization protocols.
8.3. Topics for Further Research
There are a number of areas which need to be researched before this architecture
can be fully implemented. This study only examines the protocols which make up the
basic building blocks of the architecture. Many more features need to be added to the
design before the final system can be built.
The most obvious area which needs to be worked on is the Application Layer.
The scheduling paradigm used in Section 7.4.1 to describe the clock synchronization
protocol is far too simplistic for any full implementation. Issues such as preemptive
scheduling have to be examined. Also, a Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery
(FDIR) task needs to be designed which makes use of the special characteristics of this
architecture. For example, one of the decisions made in designing the interactive
consistency protocol is to not use nested signatures during regular exchanges. FDIR
could turn on a nested signature feature to help isolate where a fault has occurred.
An additional area which needs to be examined is the relationship between the
architecture layers and the hardware upon which they are running. A constant theme
resulting from the performance overhead measurements is the necessity of optimizing the
108
I/O system calls which are used to send and receive messages over the links connecting
the processors. The time spent in these system calls increases the message processing
overhead during each message exchange. It is important that this message processing
overhead be kept low, because it determines how long the rounds within each exchange
have to be to make sure no messages are dropped. Another area which is dependent on
the hardware is the precision of the clock synchronization. Section 7.4.3 describes the
steps needed to determine this quantity, but the process needs to be verified using actual
hardware.
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Appendix A 64-Bit Modular Inverses
Private Signature Key (P) Public Signature Key (P-L)
Channel A. E7767EDF DD6BOAA9 6A6FFF29 DFCF3999
Channel B 300FEC3E 66358FED 6A554369 724D25E5
Channel C 80FDOOBF 6AA91DFB 4DEE4FB 4816533
Table A. 1 List of 64-bit modular inverses used in the implementation.
Number Private Signature Key (P) Public Signature Key (P-')
1. 9C1E8A09 615B 11EB 53170A9C EDD38EC3
2. 89E1143E 72908DE5 15791CE 3567E7ED
3. F795B5A2 3931E005 6FFOB378 6B4FECCD
4. 1FF06382 C836B5B5 6DF4AEBD 5142509D
5. 8C79563D B40701D7 507FF3C7 F04081E7
6. F44A41EE 42F13DC9 5EA41492 27216C79
7. 3811B26 7F04F271 5D91E9B2 37388E91
8. EEECFE42 D516023B 6C66FD3B 4CC386F3
9. F290151B 771CCFDF 2F366CB6 8F47AC1F
10. E45697F9 7687760B 5507BB2A D278E5A3
11. 89D2143 ECFF2F3D 3E24754B 5067A015
12. A75E386F A1E71E43 E165F06 A0539E6B
13. F6E2FC72 64A95DF1 721B5D3D C4E5F311
14. AOC76A8C 6D6AB859 5737DBB5 5F790FE9
15. E32623C6 28E15553 21F4BE57 5BC1B6DB
16. 3BC330AD B095EC6F 7A66AAE8 6940F28F
17. E022AE85 4AB669A9 663AE420 10F04A99
18. C61C94FE 2BA18883 6AED9721 14B9062B
19. B8B66F5D 627067E7 75CC1313 8855BBD7
20. 95694E7C 588COACF 5A90010C 6286BC2F
21. 96529F8D FDC508E5 6407D85D 786374ED
22. 1CC59F7F FF59489 7DD04763 7FD221B9
23. B77DC52F 6E2143B1 5CA750A1 A5012551
24. AE677A59 8027C49 5F579CD1 1FOA35F9
25. BBE13B79 65670CE5 FEF94F8 CDB3DOED
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Number
26. C787CD21 928AOA8F 7EB7CA01 83A9D46F
27. DFC61DDB 7C881655 6852A610 299C36FD
28. 2A49A338 1B9E3CD7 3B58ACB8 EBB476E7
29. 14A7E74C D 115D5AD 7C1342A9 DC505625
30. 458014C7 EFC1CC39 41546A5C 36126209
31. 9EDAED4D 9F510EBB 43768199 A7DA0673
32. 56C28594 552D3373 2B8F9744 C6CA29BB
33. D711FA5 62C6DF39 341D21EB DF8C5F09
34. A960A010 E33B73EF 5D50D2BD 8561BOF
35. 869D6590 CD16AODF 70276BOF BlSlB1F
36. 36F8E37 D655D2DB 296ECA85 D3A3D953
37. 5C8D 10E 4A5AOC15 1BE9B869 5323633D
38. C4CABCC1 54EA1DF 7A55A8FF 6FAE5A1F
39. C32B7D71 A7864A29 959COC1 6C88F219
40. 1F351E66 F33A1059 5772D503 674437E9
41. 25BE4471 2EC32645 7D552145 EAF8FC8D
42. 57758D69 9390DB1D 642B67E1 3F28BF35
43. 4C167AFB C3836C5 5DCAC7E2 FE23D80D
44. 54EF6434 392EA25 6B9A2E6A 869521AD
45. 8C190FEE 30EDC787 73EAAOOB 9EA94E37
46. C5D8D71E 4E5FFDA7 242DBC7B B9AODA17
47. B5463794 19D93187 7F94D135 9AFDC437
Table A.2 List of other 64-bit modular inverses.
or
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The actual clock synchronization protocol is represented in the model by the
reliable time source (RTS). The three subproblems from the paradigm are formally
defined by the functions performed by the RTS. First of all, the RTS is responsible for
generating the synchronization event. This function is formalized in terms of r,, rax,
and 13 as [Sch87]:
RTS1: The RTS generates synchronization events at real times t, trs... such
that
(tT = 0) A (Vi: < i:rm < tR - tRT < r.)
and the real time t at which processor p detects the event produced at trsT
satisfies
(t = ) A (i:O < i:O < tp- RTS a).
Secondly, the RTS reads the virtual clocks on the rest of the processors and uses a
convergence function to provide a new time adjustment, or
RTS2: At t, processor p obtains a value Vp that can be used in adjusting c to
lie consistent with the Virtual Synchronization (B.3) and Virtual Drift Rate (B.4)
conditions.
B.3. Formal Definition of our Clock Synchronization Protocol
The most important step in using Schneider's proof for a specific clock
synchronization protocol is in showing that the protocol fulfills certain assumptions.
These assumptions characterize the three subproblems of his paradigm and provide the
only structure for the actual model. Once a protocol has been defined in terms of the
required variables, it can replace the RTS within the model and therefore use the proof to
demonstrate the correctness of its operation.
The first subproblem, generating the synchronization event, is mathematically
described by RTS1. Providing bounds for the variables, r, rmax, and /3, shows how the
protocol fulfills this first function of the RTS. The parameters, r and rx, are the
lower and upper bounds for the (real) time interval between when the first nonfaulty
processor decides to resynchronize each time, while P bounds the (real) time which can
elapse between when the first and last nonfaulty processor resynchronizes. The proof of
correctness accounts for hardware clock drift, but any variables which depend on events
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occurring on separate processors must account for task execution drift and virtual clock
drift. In Section 7.4.3, a bound on the greatest amount of task execution drift which can
occur within an application frame was found to be R/%, where (I is a bound on
execution drift in terms of instructions per application frame, R is the frame time in
(virtual) seconds, and m is the maximum number of instructions in the application. This
factor needs to be added (for upper bounds) to the (virtual) time necessary for the interval
to be completed on one processor with respect to its virtual clock. Correcting for virtual
clock drift is simply a matter of dividing this new interval by (1 + 3) for a lower bound or
by (1-/5) for an upper bound.
Figure B.1 Placing bounds on rn and r,.
Placing bounds on rm, and rmax for the proposed clock synchronization protocol
involves examining the scheduling of resynchronizations. Figure B. 1 illustrates rmj, and
r.x for our protocol, in terms of one processor's virtual clock. Since resynchronizations
occur every time there is a From_all exchange, rmm is simply the least amount of (real)
time necessary to carry out one From_all exchange. A lower bound for rmm can be
calculated by assuming that each round of the From_all exchange must be long enough
for all of the other processors reach the point of sending their messages and then for the
message to be processed. A lower bound on the length of a message passing round does
not correct for task execution drift, since the drift is returned to zero at the beginning of
every frame (due to the scheduled interrupts), not at the end of synchronization intervals.
Since the From_all exchange uses two message passing rounds, a lower bound for rmm is
rm >) (B.5)
(1 +) '
where Fn is a lower bound on message transmission delay.
On the other hand, rmax is taken when a From_all exchange occurs at the
beginning of an application frame, followed by an application frame without a From_all
116
Appendix B. Clock Synchronization Proof of Correctness
B.1. Overview
One of the most important results of using Schneider's clock synchronization
paradigm to design a protocol is the ease of proving correct operation. In [Sch87],
Schneider provides a proof of clock synchronization which, except for certain general
assumptions, leaves solutions for his three subproblems open. Once a specific protocol is
cast in term of these assumptions, the proof can be used to show that a protocol satisfies
the correctness conditions. A number of corrections to Schneider's clock synchronization
proof are suggested by Shankar in [Sha9 1]. Shankar redefined certain components in the
system to remove the reliable time source (RTS), but these changes did not affect the
actual proof. The differences between Schneider's and Shankar's results come from
algebra errors and some latitude in Schneider's arguments which are removed in the new
version [Sha91]. For reference, Appendix C contains a list of each of the variables used
in this analysis with a definition of each.
In the following section, a more detailed description of Schneider's model is given
with the definitions necessary for understanding the proof. Our clock synchronization
protocol is then represented in terms of the assumptions about the three subproblems used
in the proof. Once it is shown that our protocol fulfills these assumptions, it follows that
the clock synchronization protocol operates correctly . The details of proving the
individual theorems can be found in [Sch87] and [Sha91].
B.2. Schneider's Formal Model of the System
Before the clock synchronization proof can be discussed, the components making
up the system need to be defined and mathematically characterized. One of the problems
in analyzing the various clock synchronization protocols found in the literature is that the
models used in the proofs vary depending on the author. Before any comparison of two
protocols can be done, the differences in the models have to be accounted for. The proofs
are hard enough to understand without having to deal with this extra complication.
Schneider attempts to provide a model which is general enough to be used for all of these
protocols. The system provided by the model is made up of virtual clocks implemented
by a reliable time source (RTS) on top of hardware clocks. Correct operation of these
components is defined as fulfilling certain requirements presented in terms of
mathematical bounds.
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Every processor has its own physical clock responsible for providing an idea of
real time. The hardware clock on a correct processor is assumed to implement a function
cp(t) on processor p which maps a real time t to a clock time. The initial value of each
hardware clock is bounded by a constant fp such that
0 < c(0) < u. (B.1)
The hardware clocks are implemented as counters which increase by one in response to
periodic events known as ticks. The width of these ticks may vary as the clock advances,
causing the clock's value to drift from real time. The amount that a hardware clock varies
from real time must be bounded by
0<l-p< (t + c) - c(t) <+p, for 0 < t, (B.2)
K
where is the hardware clock tick width and p is the hardware drift rate. If a hardware
clock conforms to these assumptions, it is considered to be nonfaulty. No such
assumptions are made about faulty clocks.
Clock synchronization protocols implement a virtual clock function p (t) on
processor p which maps a real time t to a virtual clock time. The requirements for
nonfaulty operation provide the correctness conditions which the proof must show a
protocol fulfilling. First of all, the difference between virtual clocks on correct
processors p and q must be bounded so that
Virtual Synchronization: jcq(t) - p(t)l < S, for 0 < t, (B.3)
where shows how closely the virtual clocks are synchronized. Also, the virtual clock
must advance at a rate bounded by a virtual clock drift rate ip so that
Virtual Drift Rate: 0<1-p < r +, for 0 < t, (B.4)
where ik is the virtual clock tick width and p is the virtual clock drift rate. It is
important to note that this virtual drift condition relates virtual time to real time, instead
of the relationship between virtual and hardware time used in Section 7.4.3.
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exchange. The parameter, rma, encompasses the (real) time interval between the end of
the From_all to the end to the required synchronization frame's From_all_sync exchange
(See Figure B.1). An upper bound for rmax can be found by assuming that the first
From_all exchange is completed instantaneously while the From_allsync exchange uses
the entire required synchronization interval. Finding this bound using frame boundaries
removes the need to correct for task execution drift (tasks are assumed to complete before
the end of the frame and task execution drift is returned to zero at the frame boundaries
by the scheduled interrupts.). The resulting bound (correcting for virtual clock drift) is
rmx <(2R + S) (B.6)
The final parameter used to describe clock synchronization event generation is P.
Since p is an upper bound on the (real) time which can elapse between when the first and
last nonfaulty processor resynchronizes, the parameter must account for the largest
amount of task execution drift possible. When the fastest nonfaulty processors decides to
resynchronize, the slowest nonfaulty processor's virtual clock must be within ( + R% )
real seconds of the fastest nonfaulty processor's virtual clock. Thus, the slowest
nonfaulty processor might task as long as S R% real seconds until it reaches its1-A
resynchronization point.
Specifying the remaining subproblems has already been covered in previous
sections. The second subproblem involves reading virtual clocks on other processors.
The only assumption made about this process is that an upper bound, A, can be placed
on the error involved in reading another processor's clock. An explanation of how to
quantify A is found in Section 7.4.3. The resulting bound is
< A+ R/m, (B.8)
where Ar is the message delay error and RP/ is a correction term for task execution
drift. The final subproblem involves a convergence function which is described in terms
of precision, ir, and accuracy, a . A comparison of the different precision and accuracy
of the various convergence functions can be found in Table 7.1. Since this protocol uses
CF., both the precision and accuracy of the function are 2A.
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rin 2( +rm)
(1 + )
rmax (2R + S)
13 S+Rm
A A + R%
7Cf~ ~2A
a 2A
Table B. 1 Bounds on parameters specifying clock synchronization subproblems.
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Appendix C. Glossary of Notation
This glossary contains a list of the notation used throughout this thesis. The numbers in
parentheses after each definition show the section of the thesis in which the variable is
defined.
adjp Adjustment added to processor p's hardware clock to implement its
virtual clock. (7.2.1)
cp(t) Value of p's hardware clock at real time t. (B.2)
cp(t) Value of p's virtual clock at real time t. (B.2)
Di (M#) Signing function (P M, mod 2') which uses a private key, P, for
processor i to sign a message M#. (4.3.1)
Ei(Si) Authenticating function (Si . P-1 mod 2) which uses the public key, p-',
for the private key on sender i to authenticate the signature, SA. (4.3.1)
e(x) Polynomial representing errors in a corrupted message. (4.5.1)
e Number of bits in the block size used to feed data through a CRC
generation function. Also, the number of bits in each entry of a CRC
lookup table.(4.5.2)
f Fault-tolerance degree, specifies the number of Byzantine faults masked
by the architecture. (7.3.3)
g(x) Generator polynomial for calculating CRC's. (4.5)
k Number of bits in a message. (4.2)
MIx, A k-bit message to be signed or verified. (4.3.1)
M# A n-bit representation of M,. (4.3.1)
m Maximum number of instructions in an application frame. (7.4.3)
N Total number of processors in the system. (7.3.3)
n Number of bits in a digital signature. (4.2)
p Modular inverse of P-', used as a private key by Di(M#). (4.3.2)
p-' Modular inverse of P, used as a public key by E (Si). (4.3.2)
rmax Maximum real time between synchronizations. (B.2)
r.Wn Minimum real time between synchronizations. (B.2)
R Length of an application frame in (virtual) seconds. (7.4.1)
S Length of a required synchronization frame in (virtual) seconds. (7.4.1)
Si Signature appended to the end of a message sent by processor i. (4.3.1)
Sk (M) Signaturing function which generates a signature for the message M
based upon a private key k. (4.3.1)
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s(x) Polynomial representing a CRC. (4.5)
t Real time. (7.4.3)
xi Polynomial representing a bit in the ihs bit position. (4.5)
a Accuracy of a convergence function, specifies how close a final value
obtained with N - f correct values is to the "correct" real time. (7.3.3)
JO Bound on the real time between when the first and last nonfaulty
processor resynchronizes. (B.2)
Virtual skew, maximum allowable difference between the virtual clocks.
(B.2)
(D Bound on the maximum amount of task execution drift in terms of
number of instructions/application frame. (7.4.1)
Gil Actual amount of task execution drift between processors i andj. (7.4.1).
Frmax Maximum message transmission delay. (7.4.1)
From Minimum message transmission delay. (7.4.1)
Ar Message delay error. (7.4.1)
Yi Actual message transmission delay between processors i and j. (7.3.2)
7 Estimated message transmission delay constant. (7.4.1)
K Hardware clock tick width, fixed (real) time interval between ticks of the
hardware clocks. (B.2)
- Virtual clock tick width, fixed (real) time interval between ticks of the
logical clocks. (B.2)
A Maximum clock reading error between any pair of processors. (7.4.3)
/t Range of initial values of the hardware clock. (B.2)
X Precision of a convergence function, determines how close values
obtained by two different computations of a convergence function with
varying arguments will be, so long as at least N - f arguments are
correct. (7.3.3)
p Hardware clock drift rate, rate at which the hardware clocks drift from
real time. (B.2)
Virtual clock drift rate, rate at which the logical clocks drift from real
time. (B.2)
,p[q] Estimation of the difference between the virtual clocks on processors p
and q as seen by processor p. (7.4.1)
Maximum amount of total drift in (real) time between
resynchronizations. (7.4.3)
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